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Mantenga su automovil en
mejor estado lubricandolo con
TEXACO
MOTOR Oil
El aceite de motor Texaco Motor Oil se
elabora con petroleos crudos esmerada-
mente seleccionados. Refinado como es,
por un procedimiento especial que le
quita las impurezas formadoras de car-
bon, asegura arranque rapido, potencia
maxima, motor limpio.
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i Eso es lo que quiero !
EL LUBRICANTE MARFAK para chasis
brinda proteccion lubricadora maxima
porque contiene una mezcla cientifica de
aceites pesados altamente refinados y
porque es de una cohesion extraordinaria,
por lo que protege las piezas del chdsis
por mucho mas tiempo que las grasas
ordinarias.
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POR TODAS PARTES
EN LA INDUSTRIA
Dondequiera que haya maquinaria para
lubricarse, alii habrd Productos TEXACO
y el Servicio Tdcnico TEXACO, ayudando
eficazmente a mantener el rendimiento del
equipo y a intensificar la produccion en
todas partes.
Dejese Vd. guiar por la reconocida
preferencia de que goza TEXACO en el
dominio industrial. TEXACO, por su
eficacia, puede ciertamente aumentar
tambidn el rendimiento efectivo de la
instalacion de Vd.
TEXACO
Lubricantes y Com-
bustibles Industri
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PUERTO RICO Y EL TURISMO
P
UERTO RICO, la “Suiza de las Amdricas,” brinda
a los visitantes tantos atractivos y encantos, no
s61o por sus paisajes pintorescos sino por sus sitios y
monumentos histdricos, que los turistas de otros paises,
lo mismo que los puertorriquenos mismos hallardn este
mapa de gran conveniencia en sus viajes por la bella
Borinquen. Este mapa tambidn es de gran utilidad
para muchas personas que no pueden valerse de un
mapa de mayor tamano.
Puerto Rico fu<5 descubierto por Cristdbal Col6n en
su segundo viaje al Nuevo Mundo el dia 19 de noviem-
bre de 1493. Desembarcando en la costa occidental de
la isla, el gran navegante pis6 la fertil tierra de Bor-
inquen. Juan Ponce de Ledn hizo la primera explora-
ci6n de la isla en 1508 y fundd el pueblo de Caparra.
Ponce de Le6n fud el primer explorador, colonizador,
y gobernador de Puerto Rico. La colonia se desarroll6
muy lentamente y fud atacada en varias ocasiones
durante el perlodo colonial por ingleses, franceses,
holandeses y tambidn por piratas de varios paises.
Como consecuencia de la guerra hispanoamericana
en 1898, Puerto Rico pas6 a la soberanla de los Estados
Unidos.
Puerto Rico tiene un 6rea de 8897 kildmetros cua-
drados (3435 millas cuadradas). Mide 160 kil6metros
(cien millas) de largo y 58 kildmetros (36 millas) de
ancho. En 1940 tenia una poblacidn total de 1,869,255
habitantes. Puerto Rico es un pals montafioso, con
extensos valles y llanos costaneros. Sus dos cordilleras
mds importantes son la Sierra de Luquillo, que se ex-
tiende por el este desde Lolza hasta Humacao, y la
Cordillera Central, que cruza la Isla de este a oeste,
desde Yabucoa hasta Mayaguez. El pico mejor conocido
es El Yunque, con una elevaci6n de 1062 metros (3483
pies); pero el m&s alto es la Puntita de Jayuya en la
Cordillera Central, de 1340 metros (4398 pies) sobre el
nivel del mar.
Puerto Rico es un pals muy pintoresco con sus mon-
tanas, valles, llanuras, laderas v canadas, sus 1,300 rlos,
arroyos y quebradas; bien cultivados campos de caiia,
cafe, tabaco, cocos, pinas y otros frutos; sus interesantes
poblaciones y bellas plazas publicas e hist6ricas. Todo
eso hace de la Isla una verdadera joya.
Aunque en la zona tdrrida, el clima de Puerto
Rico es benigno y saludable. Los vientos alisios,
que soplan constantemente, refrescan la atm6sfera
de modo que el promedio de la temperatura es de
76.6 grados Fahrenheit. En algunas dpocas los dlas
son calurosos, pero las noches siempre son frescas
y agradables. El promedio de lluvia es de 196 centl-
metros (77 pulgadas). Las lluvias, por lo general, son
fuertes v de poca duraei6n.
La Isla cuenta con unos 2400 kildmetros (1500 millas)
de carreteras en excelentes condiciones. Ademds, existen
unos 8000 kildmetros (4970 millas) de caminos muni-
cipales y vecinales.
A los turistas se les ofrece la oportunidad de con-
templar los paisajes, admirar las ciudades y los pueblos,
con su bello ornato publico, el moderno sistema de
alumbrado eldctrico, sus suntuosos edificios publicos y
artlsticas residencias particulares, los bien cultivados
campos y otras fases del progreso de Puerto Rico
y de la cultura de su pueblo; se quedan admirados de
las magnlficas carreteras y hermosos puentes que
hacen posible realizar viajes r&pidos, cdmodos y
agradables.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTORY
n
. •
•
this (experiment in land tenure reform) constitutes
one of the most significant efforts to face a serious social
problem now going forward in Latin America,
”
Preston E. James, Latin America. (New York: Lothrop Lee &
Shephard, 1942) p. 784.
. > .
. , o :
‘
.
'
.
.
Statement of the Problem
Puerto Rico’s problem is basically one of maladjustment
of economic resources. Whether stated as overpopulation, a
term so glibly overused by both Island and continental Ameri-
can observers, or as underproductive monoculture, overconcen-
tration in the production of sugar cane, the problem is re-
garded by many Puerto Ricans themselves as insoluble. It is
the purpose of this study not so much to analyze the problems
of the Island, nor to attempt any suggestion of solution.
Rather, the emphasis of this study is on the attempt of a
recently organized Puerto Rican political party to right what
it considers the wrongs in the Insular economy. Although
general reference must be made to many phases of the Popular
Democratic program, yet this study develops most completely
an analysis of the land reform program.
Significance of the Problem
Puerto Rico has been, in a very real sense, an experi-
ment in colonial government. Almost without a realization
of the responsibilities involved, Americans began the admini-
stration of this former Spanish island some forty-nine years
ago. From time to time during these years, official Washing-
ton has let it be known that it regards the Island as a sort
of half way house— a common meeting place for Latin and
Anglo-Saxon cultures and has intimated that it feels Puerto
..
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3Rico’s role in this light can he a major one. How completely
or consistently any attempt has been made to give reality to
this ideal can only be drawn from inference in a study of this
sort. Yet, the very significance of this stated ideal is that,
in a sense, it is very true. Puerto Rico is carefully watched
by all Latin Americans to determine the substance of America's
Good Neighbor Policy.
To say that the Federal Government has a policy toward
Puerto Rico is to infer from a series of disconnected and
dispersed action a pattern. To the Islander this pattern
has reality and constitutes in a crazy-quilt fashion his idea
of what Washington plans for the Island. From Washington the
pattern is seen to be, what it must always be until Puerto
Rico is given representation in the Congress, no pattern at all.
The effect of this negative policy has been to cause
Puerto Ricans to feel rather misplaced and until recently as
if they were step-children. Even stepchildren, however, de-
velop self reliance in response to desperate situations. The
recent rise of a self determinative party with a definite
and realistic program cannot fully be explained by the exis-
tence of a "New Deal” in Washington. The Puerto Ricans feel
themselves forced to act in a desperate situation where no
one else seems willing or able to act in their behalf. In an
agricultural economy any program for resolving economic ills
must deal mainly with land, its use, its products, its distri-
bution, and Its underlying importance to all citizens.
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4The program for land reform in Puerto Rico is of far
reaching significance for all Americans--North and South.
The Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico will, if success-
ful, have blazed a new trail in agrarian readjustment. In no
sense can these events now transpiring in this insular pos-
session be regarded as solely of importance to the inhabitants,
or to official Washington. They must be seen to effect rather
specifically land use ideas everywhere.
Definition of Terms
There must, of necessity, be frequent reference to new and
rather strange terminology when a study is made of a land or
culture where a language other than the one of the person mak-
ing the study is in general use. It is impossible in advance
to define all new words but some will require rather complete
treatment.
Puerto Rico ("Rich Port"), the name of the Insular Pos-
session more completely described later, is generally known
among continental Americans as Porto Rico. In 1932 Congress
officially adopted the above name as the title of the Island
to accord with modem Spanish spelling*
Americans—continental and insular. Among Islanders who
are very proud of their citizenship a distinction is made be-
tween continentals and Insulars. One becomes used to hearing
himself referred to as a continental after a short stay in the
Island.
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5Jib aro (pronounced hee-bar-o) refers specifically to white
mountaineers who inhabit the interior of the Island. The deri-
vation of this word is uncertain.
Colono
,
colonla-- terms used to describe farmer-managers
of individual farm units on a sugar plantation. Many colonos
are independent owners of the land. A colonia is the lend
occupied by a colono. The units of a sugar plantation are
called colonia. For example, Walcott colonia.
Central—Sugar cane crushing mills are called in Puerto
Rico as in Cuba "Centrales", perhaps because of their location
with reference to the supplying farms. These will bear many
names and in general the name of the central has much more
common usage than the name of the operator. Thus, Central
San Vicente in the north central portion of the Island is
x
better known than Robert Hermanos, Inc., the owners and opera-
tors of the mill.
Cuerda— a unit of surface measurement of land. It is
about equal to an acre, exactly 0.974 acre. The terms acre
and cuerda are used interchangeably in all but exact studies.
In general, this study will use the word cuerda except where
acre is actually meant.
Chapter Organization
The Popular Democratic Party is of comparatively recent
origin (1938) but the program for land reform offered by it
along with the problem this program attempts to alleviate are
..
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6not recent. Beginning with the American occupation of the
Island and with the setting up of civil government in 1900,
this study traces the attempts at land reform to the present.
Chapter II, "Crowded Land", presents Puerto Rico in as
sympathetic a light as possible with a restatement of its prob-
lem, a consideration of its assets, geographical, economic,
and social.
The basic land law, the so-called 500 acre provision, the
foundation for present legal action to reform land tenure in
the Island, its origin, probable purpose, enforcement, and
economic significance is the subject of the third chapter.
Chapter Four traces the attempts at land reform prior to
1935 while Chapter Five discusses application of "New Deal"
policies to the Insular Land problem.
The Popular Democratic party, its origin, its program,
its leaders, and its political success— as it has induced land
reform on a general scale gets intensive treatment in Chapter
Six.
The purpose of Chapter Seven is to analyze the possibili-
ties of future success for the Popular Democratic program,
while Chapter Eight ends the study with a number of conclusions
necessarily drawn from a consideration of the economic impli-
cations of this vital land reform plan.
Related Studies
Increasing awareness of the economic dilemma of Puerto
Rico has brought In recent years a veritable flood of
'•
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.
.
.
.
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.
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7popularized studies of Insular problems. Few of these can be
found to be of value in a careful study of the land reform
program. The very nearness of the problem, the emotional
emphasis that a desperate situation brings with it, and the
lack of understanding of the past history of the Island have
made many of the recent ’'problem” books and articles of ques-
tionable worth.
There are three excellent studies of Puerto Rico and the
Puerto Rican economy to which frequent reference will be made.
The first of these in chronological order is the Brookings
Institution report entitled "Porto Rico and Its Problems"
published in 1930. Victor Clark, the director of the research
project, herein reported, and his associates examined the
Island at first hand and made careful analyses of many phases
of the Insular economy. The value of the report lies in the
careful comparison of the Puerto Rican economy with that of
similarly distressed islands, also sugar growing, the first
rate analysis of agricultural possibilities by trained obser-
vers and the unprejudiced evaluation of Insular resources.
Any careful research into Puerto Rico’s problems must of neces-
sity draw much from the work.
The result of a suggestion by two land-owning partner-
ships in Puerto Rico, the study by Arthur D. Gayer, Paul T.
Homan and Earle R. James entitled "The Sugar Economy of Puerto
Rico" published by the Columbia University Press in 1938, is
probably the best general survey of the Insular sugar monoculture.
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8Many of the conclusions of these investigators formed the
basis for action by the Popular Democratic Party* The Land
problem is very completely discussed in Chapter Nine. No other
study has such information as is here contained.
The third major reference was perhaps not intended to be
more than autobiographical In scope. Rexford Guy Tugwell,
latdly Governor of Puerto Rico and from the earliest New Deal
days closely associated with the President and the Secretary
of Interior in policy-making for the Island, has written from
his personal journal this very complete outline of recent
political events. Because Governor Tugwell is also a professor
of economics It is not to be wondered at that many complete ex-
planations of economic facts are herein contained. "Stricken
L&nd" published early this year by Doubleday is admittedly
dull to anyone who does not know or care about Puerto Rico but
to those few who do, it is a fascinating inside story of a
reform in progress.
Reference will also be made to other works to be found
listed in the bibliography, to periodical articles, and to
personal observations made by the writer while in Army service
in the Island as well as to lectures by officials of the
Insular Government, press reports, and personal letters from
the Popular Democratic leadership. It must be admitted, how-
ever, that there is a relative paucity of truly scientific
analyses of insular problems. Perhaps this study can be an
additional source of information to subsequent students of the
,*
-
.
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.
.
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Island’s economy.
Method of Procedure
The lack of general knowledge regarding Puerto Rico makes
it necessary to approach this survey of land tenure reform
from an historical basis. It will be necessary to give back-
ground information, supply essential factors of time and place
reference, and to describe social reactions. The principal
emphasis is on economic analysis but here and there a touch of
sociological analysis will be found.
The tendency of many studies of social and economic change
is to take sides in accordance with the conscious or unconscious
prejudices of the author. The purpose of this paper is to dis-
cuss with proper historical, economic, and social background
the program of the Popular Democratic Party in Puerto Rico as
evidenced in the Land Law of 1941 and its administration and to
compare such similar contemporary and antecedent programs as may
form a fair basis for judgment of the progress and success of
the subject program.
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Chapter II
CROWDED LAND
"The Congress of a country which has never enacted laws to
oppress or abridge the rights of citizens within its domains
• . • may be safely trusted not to depart from its well-settled
practice in dealing with the inhabitants of this island."
American Peace Commissioners (1898) Quoted in Bailey W. and
Justine Whitfield Diffie, Porto Rico : a Broken Pledge
,
(New
York: Vanguard Press, 193ll
«.
.
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Imagine an island 110 miles long at its greatest length
and 35 miles wide at its greatest expansion in every square
mile of which live some 550 individuals.
1
Superimpose upon
that island a very rugged system of mountains and plateaus
covering all hut the coastal region and subtract from the total
available land area the swamps, the wooded areas, the parks,
the useless lands in the sense of dwelling places and you fur-
ther crowd those people. Then suppose that people to depend
for their livelihood almost entirely on agricultural and allied
pursuits. Add to all this an unimpeded birth rate and a de-
creasing death rate and the substance of Puerto Rico^ problem
becomes evident.
The Island
,
Its People and Recent History
The islands of the Caribbean, commonly called the West
Indies, are the tops of a vast mountain range stretching almost
3,000 miles from western Cuba to Trinidad at the coast of
South America and linked with the Andean chain of continental
South America. Of this group of thousands of islands there are
four large ones, the Greater Antilles in direct semicircular
sequence—Jamaica, Cuba, Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico—each simi-
lar in many ways and yet vastly different. Puerto Rico, the
smallest and easternmost, is bounded on the north by the
Atlantic, on the west by the Mona Passage which separates the
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island from the Dominican Republic, on the south by the Carib-
bean, and on the east by a very deep strait, Roosevelt Roads.
Puerto Rico is in fact a mountain crest, volcanic in origin.
To the north of Puerto Rico are the Milwaukee Deep, 28,000
feet down and the Brownson Deep. To the south the Caribbean
reaches a depth of 12,000 feet. The submerged mountain chain
of which Puerto Rico is a part would be the highest in the
world, if it were above rather than below sea level. Includ-
ing the satellite islands of Vieques, Culebra, and Mona, the
total land area of Puerto Rico is 3,425 square miles or about
2,000,000 acres, almost three-fourths of which lie in the
mountainous interior of the island.
Puerto Rico is tropical, but in a somewhat different sense
than most Americans conceive of the tropics for the weather is
like an eternal spring day and flowers are blooming the year
around. There is no excessive heat and one would do well to
have a light top coat for the evenings and cool mornings in
the winter months. Palm trees are characteristic; bamboo
grows in great clumps along the roads and streams; flamboyant
trees cover the roads and in the spring time the roadways
appear from a distance to be streaks of pink, white, and
yellow; African tulip trees, bougainvillea and hibiscus are
splashes of vivid color against the prevailing green. Puerto
Rico is in the hurricane zone and once in a while a severe
2
hurricane lashes the island. Yet there have been fewer such
2
The last severe one was San Ciprian, Sept. 26, 1932. They are
named for the saint on whose day they occur.
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disasters in recent years than in Florida and other parts of
the continental east coast. With the exception of the dry
southern coastal plain centering about Ponce, rainfall is
heavy the year around, yet San Juan records a yearly average
of five sunless days.
Discovered by Columbus on November 19, 1493 Puerto Rico
is the only place under the American flag where the Genoese
explorer landed. Exactly where he landed is still a matter
of dispute among a number of west coast towns but it is
generally supposed that the Aguada-Aguadilla region is probab-
ly the most logical. It was Columbus who named the island,
calling it San Juan Bautista (St. John the Baptist). It is
a fact of interest that the name applied to the port of the
island, Puerto Rico, later came to be applied to the whole
island whereas the name of the island came to be applied
solely to the port city. There were Indians of the Boriquen
tribe on the island when the Spanish occupied it but although
relics of their presence are to be seen in caves and mounds
here and there on the island and the faces of some Puerto
Ricans have a distinctly Indian hue, yet most of the Bori-
quenos were extinct within a century after Columbus 1 discovery
Four hundred years of Spanish occupation have molded the
island* s culture. The fact that Puerto Rico’s natural re-
sources were not nearly so great as those of Cuba or nearby
Hispaniola made it a defense out-post, sought after during
the hectic seventeenth century by Dutch and British, but since
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that time remaining in the quiet hack eddies of trade. Not
until the close of the eighteenth century did Puerto Rico
begin to develop a life of its own. Although demands for
autonomy made themselves increasingly felt as the nineteenth
century wore on, no great revolutionary movement sprang up.
Puerto Rico became in fact a haven for escaping loyalists
from Venezuela, New Granada, and Mexico. Only one minor revolt
marked the century, the famous "Grito de Lares" (1868) quickly
and easily put down. By 1897 the Spanish Cortes was ready to
concede self-rule to the then province of Puerto Rico and had
in fact granted a Charter of Autonomy.
Barely had the new autonomy begun when American occupa-
tion resulting from the Spanish-American War took place.
General Nelson A. Miles landed at Guanica on the South Coast
in July of 1898 "to bring protection ... and (the) blessings
of the liberal institutions of our (American) government."
From 1898 to 1934 the Island was administered by the War Depart-
ment which still exercises great influence on the life of the
average Puerto Rican. Created in 1934 the Division of Terri-
tories and Island Possessions in the Department of the Interior
has acted as a general guiding agency for insular affairs since
that time.
The people of Puerto Rico, American citizens since 1917,
are descended from the Spanish who conquered and occupied the
island, the Indians whom the Spanish found there, the Negroes
who were brought as laborers from the West Coast of Africa, and
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the mixture of Portuguese, Syrian, Corsican, French, Dutch,
and more recently continental American elements. Despite
this apparently great admixture, the Puerto Ricans are very
homogeneous, perhaps the result of living together on a small
island for so long a period of time.
The first Spaniards in Puerto Rico were from the southern
3
Spanish province of Andalucia, upperclass adventurers and cer-
tainly not colonists. From the early Spanish occupying armies
4
deserters fled into the mountains and today the "jibaro" may
trace his descent from these independent souls. The influx
of loyalists from South and Central American territories which
were rebelling against Spain and France increased and strength-
ened the white population of the island in the early nineteenth
century.
"The Puerto Rican today has been conditioned by life on
a small island, governed always by a people far away, from whom
he was isolated by thousands of miles of water, and finally
shifted by conquest from the domination of one country to
5
another.
”
Of particular interest to the continental American is the
complete lack of racial distinction between Negroes and whites.
In fact, the classification Negro is reserved only for those
3
’’The language of the 16th and 17th centuries is to be found in
tact in the mountain regions of Puerto Rico along with the man-
ner of .life of Andalusia and Castile’.' Translated from an arti-
f^a?nilSiT^0voi?°xtv55S^0p?pSSif
Univer3al Ilu3trada < Baroe-
4
A term used to signify the white mountaineers. Cf. Definitions,
Chapter I.
^Max Ax EgjLoff , , Direqtor of „ Information on Puerto Rico, PuertoRico Handbook (San Juan, 1947) p. 11. 9
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obviously so as in other Spanish and Portuguese -speaking Repub-
lics and census figures on the relative strength of the Negro
and white population are complicated by the fact that Puerto
Rican enumerators and American evaluators differ on the inclu-
sive coverage of the word "Negro". At present, census figures
show the whites to outnumber the Negroes by a 3 to 1 ratio,
with the number of whites steadily increasing. There are Negroe
in all walks of life and at all levels of social stratification
in the Island.
Population Density and Pressure
Whatever solution be sought for the socio-economic prob-
lems of Puerto Rico, that solution must recognize the very
real pressure of population. People have always a tendency to
increase their numbers faster than the ability of the soil
—
the living space— to support them, so said Maithus. Whether
or not this is true in general application, an island, and
especially a relatively small one, is faced by this land
shortage as soon as births exceed deaths sufficiently to insure
continued growth in numbers. Such a condition has existed in
Puerto Rico from the beginning of the nineteenth century with
an increase every 21 years to the present of about half again
as much, although in the 21-year period between 1821 and 1842
6
the population doubled. The overall increase has been from
g
These interpolations of population figures are the writer 1 s
own. Fox* figures see Annual Book on Statistics of Puerto Rico
1945-44 (a mimeographe^TTBg^al"pUbTTs by TTTsVETar T>e^7tT-
ment of Agriculture and Commerce, San Juan, P.R.)
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156,000 in 1800 to an estimated 2,200,000 in 1947, while the
average number of inhabitants per square mile has gone up from
45 to 550.
We must further expand the Malthusian laws of population
to take into account the fact that the ability of a given bit
of land to support an increased population is conditioned by
the use that land is put to. Conceivably an industrial economy
such as obtains in Rhode Island or Belgium for example, in-
definitely, extends the ability of the land to support people.
Likewise, an intensive agricultural economy such as obtains in
Java or Japan apparently is able to increase the output of the
soil to such an extent as to permit vast numbers to occupy rela-
tively small areas. No comparison between Puerto Rico and other
similar locations adequately reveals, however, the real nature
of the population pressure on this Caribbean island.
The problem arising out of the increase in population is
simply the lack of balance between resources and the total num-
ber of Puerto Ricans. Add to that inbalance the continental
American concept of a standard of living by which Puerto Rico,
an American possession, will always, somewhat unfairly, be
judged, and the problem increases in proportion. One Insular
and two Federal government agencies have estimated the annual
cost per family for minimum living standards on the Island to
be between $675 and $1,000. Yet the available data indicates
an annual average family income for 85 out of every 100 Puerto
1 ' •
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Rican families of less than $400.
The birth rate is very high and rising (from an average
of 39.5 per 1,000 for the period 1938-1943 to a present 42.3
per 1,000) while the high death rate continues to fall (from
an average of 19.8 per 1,000 for the period 1935-1939 to about
14.1 per 1,000 for 1945). A somewhat paradoxical explanation
lies in the fact that the effect of American efforts to raise
health standards through disease control and increased medical
services has been to decrease the total standard of living.
It is interesting to note too that a high birth rate combined
with a relatively high death rate has produced a very youthful
8
people, undeniably an asset when the problems facing the
Island demand so new an approach.
"The total land area, however, is only slightly
over 2,000,000 acres and the land as a whole is not
fertile. Approximately half of it is not fit for
cultivation. Most of that which can be used requires
fertilizer and much of it is heavily eroded. Because
land is so scarce in relation to the population
(about half an acre of tillable land per person in
1940) it has been cultivated intensively, although
on the whole not efficiently. But the best methods
of land cultivation now known could not make it pos-
sible for Puerto Ricans to live well from the land 9
alone. This, until recently, they have tried to do."
7U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Wage Earners and Wages in
Puerto Rico, 1939." Monthly Labor Review
, 53: 1572-74;Dec . 1941
U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, "Living and Of-
iervio|e5§“§§, Cg^ 3l-3, PXprh Si?!" ' International Beference
Puerto Rico_Planning and Urbanizing Board, A Development Plan
?u®r ~fc° (San Juan, Office of Information for Buerbo
TTTco, date T3TT)
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"One Crop" Economy
While a survey of Puerto Rican agriculture will reveal
a considerable variety of agricultural products, yet of the
amazingly wide range, only sugar is of major importance,
though both coffee and tobacco have in times past played a
more significant part in the economy than they do now. Es-
sentially, cane sugar is the "money crop" and the island
lives from the proceeds of the sale of sugar cane and its
by-products
.
The available information taken from any insular govern-
ment report will show the dependence on sugar cane production.
Of the general fund revenue receipts for the fiscal year
10
1943-44, $65,000,000 of the total of $103,000,000 was
directly traceable to the sugar cane industry. More than
one-third of the total labor force in that year was employed
directly in sugar cane production and allied industries and
that figure would be increased if all who indirectly owed
their employment primarily to sugar cane were included. Of
the total assessed valuation of land for agricultural use
one half represented the value of sugar lands, whereas only
one sixteenth of the tillable soil was sown in sugar cane.
Seventy- three per cent of the exports from the Island in
1943-1944 were either sugar or its by-products. Evay single
table in any report proves overwhelmingly the dominant position
of sugar in the insular economy.
10
An abnormally high year, due especially to revenue from ram
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The very nature of the sugar market places Puerto Rico
at the mercy of a variable price structure which is subject
to great fluctuation. Sugar, a necessity, has a constant
demand in the world market and therefore suffers from all the
inelasticity characteristic of necessities. The variation in
the crop from year to year and the inventories of warehouses
on the continent, the close competition of Hawaii, Cuba, and
British West Indian islands are factors which may mean great
loss or gain to Puerto Rico and are factors over which the
Island has no control.
The very natural question arises -- Would Puerto Rico be
better off economically if some of the land now devoted to
sugar cane were diverted to other crops? Although the best
answer apparently is in the negative, no definite answer can
be given. Certain is it that sugar alone can bring such large
11
revenue for so little investment. Perhaps the solution lies
12
as some now feel with a development of industry rather than
with any change in the agricultural exploitation of land except
"The answer which the sugar companies give . • • runs on eco-
nomic and technical grounds somewhat as follows: Cane culti-
vation represents the most economical use of the heavy low
lying lands, creating more wealth and supporting more people
than any alternative use of the same lands.” A.D. Gayer, P.T.
Homan, E.K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico " (N.Y:
Col. Univ. Press, 1938) p, 294.
12]
”The most profitable crop for the low lands, thanks in large
measure to the U.S. protective tariff is sugar. An acre of
land then has perhaps a 20% greater value for the cultivation
of cane than it has for any other small crop and cane does
not lend itself profitably to cultivation on small farms."
Theodore Roosevelt. Jr., "Land Problems in Puerto Rico and the
Philippine Islands", Geographical Review (New York) 24:182,
87
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as regards methods. The one-crop economy of Puerto Rico is
not of itself an evil, then, if some other methods of provid-
ing insular income can he found.
"And thus lived the farm laborers of Puerto
Rico, producing profits for others to enjoy, tremb-
ling from the cold in December and January because
he didn't have clothes, sending his children to
school without shoes because he did not have the
wherewithal to purchase them, seeing his children
die because he did not have money to buy medicine
in time, while over there—beyond the seas— the
great managers of the large mills, rich and with
many millions became richer and richer.
Of all the features of the sugar cane economy the factor
of absenteeism is most elusive. It is frequently asserted
and always used in campaign oratory, as above, as a basic
argument for change. The strong implication is always that
wealth that might have increased the living standard of the
average Puerto Rican ha3 been heartlessly siphoned off by
14
evil but wealthy malfeasants. Basically, there exists a
misinterpretation of the nature of capitalist ownership of
property, of the phenomena so common as to be axiomatic, of
the separation of ownership and management in modem life.
of the necessity for dividend payments and other charges. It
is hard to explain to a Puerto Rican farmhand why he works for
13
Taken from a pamphlet "Fincas de Beneficio Proporcional" (San
Juan: Autoridaa de Tierras
,
"±y4TT
more than 70/£ of the total acreage planted to sugarcane
(is. ownec or controlled by companies which in turn are con-
trolled almost fxclusiyely by absentee stockholders: the com-
cpntholled produce normally 59% of ,_th
the Island, thus controlling almost
tipn
not prove
?£§rifv^hia
Justice
e exteni
(ill#
Frankfurter's brief,
of absentee ownershr
e v.
^uota-
Such statpmeyts^do
ip nor conclus:
?g
at all, about who owns the stock and where they
s not all corporate ownership absentee?
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as low as eight dollars a week during the harvest season (from
four to six months of the year) and must do without during the
growing season and yet others get handsome incomes from sugar.
Perhaps no explanation can fully satisfy.
Figures reveal very little. In a recent year American-
owned interests produced 31^ of the total crop "but the phrase
American-owned reveals nothing as to the nature of actual owner-
ship or distribution of income. Many wealthy Puerto Ricans live
on the continent and to the extent that their ownership is an
"absentee" ownership they too must be so classed. One survey
of this problem reported.
"The attitudes which exist ... are naturally colored by
emotion. A common feeling is a reaction against control
of large tracts by a few persons in a situation where
land scarcity ... is pronounced."
"... Land hunger creates resentment quite indepen-
dent of the economic merits of the case. nlt)
Divested of its emotional content and disengaged from
its political connotation the phrase "absentee ownership"
means simply that the owners are not resident in Puerto Rico.
The significance of the question of absentee ownership lies
not in where the owners live but whether the money they re-
ceive represents a real drain on the Insular economy. The
only complete studies made show that the flow of money has
15
Gayer et al, 0£. cit . , p. 243, p. 313.
••
.
.
•
• • «
J*
' I 2 .
'
H
•
• • »
•
, i
'
• *
,
.
• •
.
.
16been Into rather than away from Puerto Rico.
Sugar Cane Farming t Methods, and Land Usage
Sugar has been at all times an article of primary neces-
sity, a good source of food and energy as well as of pleasure.
Sugar in some form is to be found in most plants and fruits
but the sugar cane and the sugar beet are the best sources of
pure sugar although a very small percentage of commercial
sugar is obtained from the maple tree.
Sugar cane needs a very warm climate, fertile soil, and
abundant rainfall or irrigation. All these Puerto Rico has.
In addition to sugar; alcohol, molasses, syrups and acetone
are products of the cane. The rough reedy remainder of the
cane left when the sugar juices are removed, bagasse, is used
In the making of celluloid, and also as a food for cattle.
Sometimes It is used as a fuel for the sugar central. Recently,
more and more uses are being found for this former waste
product.
Columbus is said to have introduced sugar cane into the
West Indies, planting it first in Santo Domingo from whence
the culture was transplanted to Puerto Rico. Upon American
occupation in 1898 there were in the Island some 2,400 sugar
cane farmers and the number has grown since then to some
12,000, due especially to the great demand for sugar from the
continental United States coupled with the existence of a
duty-free market. Of the 310,000 cuerdas sown with sugar cane
16
’’There are two clear points to be made: first, the investment
would not have been made except for an anticipated outward
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in recent years approximately one half were corporation lands
prior to the institution of the present government policy of
enforcement of the 500 acre limitation upon corporate land
17
holdings
•
Oane grows test along the level plains of the coastal
region although in the years since World War I the number of
upland farms planted in sugar cane has increased as former
coffee lands were turned to sugar production. The best rea-
sons for the destruction of the coffee lands were the very low
world price for coffee and the effect of a number of disastrous
hurricanes. Add to these factors the strong price position of
sugar and one can readily understand the increasing desire of
former coffee producers to see their lands bring a profit.
The land used in the cultivation of cane must be very
thoroughly prepared in order that the crop can grow luxuriant
and strong. The land must be plowed deeply and several times
so that the roots can get a firm hold and penetrate the earth's
surface. The land must be ditched so that there can be a com-
plete distribution of water in those farms where irrigation
is used and to provide runoffs for the torrential rains. Once
the land is thoroughly plowed the seeds are placed in small
holes or in ditches depending on the method used and from
16 (cont.) flow of earnings; and second, the investment has led
to a creation of wealth much larger than the withdrawals, so
that the flow has not been historically speaking, n a drain"
17
or money into Puerto Rico.
r
See Chapter III for a discussion of this 500 acre law.
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thence grows the tall cane. Land in Puerto Rico often needs
fertilizer and a great deal is used. Weeding the fields of
cane is another difficult task in the year round care that
the cane requires, hut to growers and laborers alike the
blossoming of the white tassels ("arrows 1’) in early January
is a sign that all has gone well and an ample harvest is at hand.
18
Sugar cane does not need to be replanted every year.
Shortly after being cut during the harvest, the trunks begin
to grow anew and many farmers use the same plants over and over
again until they begin to show signs of weakening when they are
replanted. Sugarcane takes from 12 to 18 months to ripen fully.
The 12-months season ends in early January and among the growers
this crop is called the spring cane (siembra de primavera)
whereas the cane that is allowed to ripen over 18 months is
called "la gran cultura."
When the harvest season arrives (la zafra) there is ex-
citement in all of Puerto Rico as once again the Island begins
to hum and pockets begin to jingle with unaccustomed money.
The roads fill up with long lines of cane trucks and the cane
railways bear their unending trains of small cane-wagons. The
harvest season begins in January and lasts from four to six
months on an average. The sooner the cane can be harvested the
greater is apt to be the return from the crop for the cane has
a way of losing its sugar content as it stands uncut in the
fields. The more the sugar yields of a given plot of sugar
18
When a new crop is harvested from old cane it is called a
ratoon.
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the greater the profit.
There are some 42 large sugar mills in the Island--cen-
trales— the largest being in the south coast town of Guanica.
Giant presses in these mills crush the cane, producing a mash
from which sugar is later obtained. On the average the sugar
yield per ton of sugarcane is 12$ though in individual cases
great variation will be found. These giant mills used to be
limited in their production to the preparation of the sugar
for refining in the large refineries on the continent but
more recently these mills have been refining all the sugar
used on the Island as well as sending increasing amounts of
refined sugar to continental markets.
The Jones-Cos tigan Act of 1934 has limited the production
of the sugar-producing countries alloting to each a quota to
prevent overproduction. The purpose of these quotas insofar
as the sugar producers are concerned has been well served
although the full effect of such restrictions has been to in-
crease unemployment in the Island for there is no other indus-
try to divert those not employed in the sugar industry. More
recently the effect of the sugar rationing has been to stabi-
lize the market and to assure each producer of full sale of
all his crop although the end of the war has brought increasing
complaints that the return is not sufficiently high to keep up
with the rising prices of things the producers of sugar use.
This very summary glance at sugar production can only give
an idea of all the intricacies of sugar production but it can
..
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help to make one understand the importance of the sugar indus-
try to the Island as a whole.
In essence, then, Puerto Rico has reached an economic
crossroads. An increasing population, a stationary supply of
natural resources and a national product the rewards of which
are not sufficient even where evenly distributed, to provide
a satisfactory standard of living are factors which make for
an apparently insoluble problem*
. o .
.
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CHAPTER III
THE 500 ACRE LAW
"Surely nothing more immediately touches . .. Puerto Rico than
legislation giving effect to the Congressional restriction on
corporate landholdings. This policy was born of the special
needs of a congested population largely dependent upon the
land for its livelihood." Justice KLix Frankfurter, People
of Puerto Rico vs. Rubert Hmnos., Inc., 309 U.S. 543, 64 L. Ed
§16 (March 25, T§40j:
s. . .
.
,
. .
.
"
An already crowded island containing almost a million
inhabitants, Puerto Rico was largely a land of small farms and
small scale agriculture when General Miles occupied it in 1898,
There were admittedly, as there had always been, large estates
on the coastal plains which in the past had been worked by
gangs of slaves.'
1
' In the last half of the nineteenth century,
these were being increasingly planted with sugar csne, but
coffee and tobacco still were first in the list of Puerto Rican
exports. In general the number of family held farms that were
larger than 500 acres was very small and no corporate body held
that rauch.^
The first act of the new government in 1898 was to adapt
the system of Spanish laws, already in existence, to American
codes. As much was to be retained of the familiar legal pro-
cedure as would be consistent with American practice. In
kost of the flat lands in Puerto Rico have always been in fair-
ly large estates held originally under royal grants and culti-
vated by slaves; but the hilly interior was settled to a great
extent by squatters and small farmers who carved homesteads
for themselves out of the virgin forest." Victor S. Clark & jAss., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington: Brookings Insii-
tution, ±yo0) p. 7T95.
9
S
owever, land concentration was ^a fact even in 1899.
owing table compiled from the Census of 1899 shows
mum amount of land in farms of less than 100 acres:
..
The fol-
the maxi-
Size in Acres No. of Farms Maximum Extent
0-4 acres 22,527 89 , 308 acres
5-9 »! 7,417 66,753 it
10-19 ti 9,503 85,507 tt
20-49 h 7,979 143,521 tt
50-99 it 994
38, 17*0
98,456 tt
tt
Over 100 tt 851 1,271,179 tt
Thus 851 holders had 12% of
(Washington, 1899).
the total. Census of Porto Rico
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addition a basic law was needed, a Constitution, by which the
administrators of the Island might be guided.
The new officials were perhaps overly aware of the dif-
ferences in cultural background and while anxious to do what
was necessary to bring the level of Puerto Rican economic life
up to that of the continent, they were not desirous of destroy-
ing the basis of the society already in existence. What little
experience Americans had had in colonial administration, led
them to feel strongly about exploitation and waste of colonial
resources. They somehow felt, and rightly so, that a democratic
nation had a duty toward all its citizens and subjects--a duty
to provide for their common welfare. Thus it was that included
among the many provisions for increasing self-government and
education for democracy, the first organic law did contain a
provision against land concentration. It must be remembered
also that during this period the government had been engaged
in a strenuous fight against concentration in industry. The
sugar industry had not been unscathed in this fight. Congress
did not want to seem to be giving the sugar interests a new
territory for exploitation under the guise of bringing demo-
cracy to Puerto Rico.
On May 1, 1900, the United States Congress passed the joint
resolution which coincident with the Foraker Act formed the
basic law of the new possession. This so-called Organic Act
was far more liberal than similar legislation for other occupied
9
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territories and reflected in part the peaceful occupation of
the Island and the general acceptance of American rule on the
part of the average Puerto Rican. This organic act provided
among other things that
"No corporation shall he authorized to conduct
the business of buying and selling real estate or be
permitted to hold or own real estate except such as
may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out
the purpose for which it was created, and every cor-
poration hereinafter authorized to engage in agricul-
ture shall by its charter be restricted to the owner-
ship and control of not to exceed 500 acres of land
... Corporations not organized in Porto Rico and doing
business therein, shall be bound by the provisions of
this section so far as they are applicable.
As originally approved by the House of Representatives,
this resolution consisted in an absolute prohibition to corpora-
tions to engage in agriculture. Obviously it was fervently
desired by the Congress that the tilling of the soil be done
by farmers in their own interest and that they should not
5
subserve investors. Was this best for the insular economy?
4Joint Resolution No . 25 , op. cit.
5
A quotation from People v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc
. ,
309 U.S. 543
84L Ed 916 supports this inte rpre tation
.
"Puerto Rico has a total area of 3,435 square miles,
equivalent to 2,198,000 acres, of which 1,222,284 are
tillable. The population of the island in 1898, when
Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States, was 953,243
souls. The total area of land devoted to the cultiva-
tion of sugarcane was at that time 70,000 acres.
"The congressional debates in the year 1900, during the
discussion of the bill to impose 25% of the Dingley
Tariff on all goods imported from Puerto Rico into the
United States and vice versa and of the Organic ActiForaker Acp) for the establishment of a civil government
in Puerto Rico, reveal the foresight of those ^members ofCongress who expressed the fear that free trade between
Puerto Rico and the United States would make the island
too attractive for the investment of large amounts of
capital. in sugar and toeacco. with the probable result
of placing most if not all of the tillable soil of the
island under the ownership and control of the sugar and
tobacco trusts. This fear was intensified by the fact
that the year before, in 1899, the island had been
. . c
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An agricultural economy depends for its prosperity upon the
advantageous exchange of its production from the soil with
that of other and different economies. The more profitable
such an exchange is, the better off are the farmers and
laborers on the land, the merchants and the shippers. Y/hat
must be sought is a crop or a number of crops whose returns
as compared with the investment of capital, land and labor
are high. Ideally this was true of sugar alone of all the
products that Puerto Rico was able to produce in quantity and
then in production on the island and a sugar economy does not
flourish under an unorganized small farm system.
Sugar production is most profitable when done on a large
scale. It was then obvious from the first that there was to
be a conflict between the spirit of this provision and the
desire of the sugar producers, both insular and continental,
who very soon after the beginning of the twentieth century,
came to include most of the large farmers on the island and
especially in the coastal plains regions most suited to sugar,
to make the most advantageous use of their lands under the new
conditions. An analysis of the economic and social scene in
Puerto Rico in the first decade of the twentieth century con-
demned the 500 acre provision as a curse:
5
Oont.) devastated by. a cyclone, with the consequent loss of
crops, and depreciation and mortgage of its best lands. To
prevent the development of an agrarian monopoly which would
own and control tnfe oest lanas of this small and densely popu-
lated island, and which might eventually convert the island
into, a large sugar factory. served, by a naif slave proletariat
and to encourage the division of lands Into small tracts,
ownea, controlled and cultivated by their owners, the Congress
enacted Joint Resolution No. 23, approved May 1, 1900."
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"In April 1900 Congress with the best of
motives provided for the protection of the Porto
Ricans from greedy corporations. It was thought
that the land of Porto Rico should be owned by her
own people and not by large land companies ...
Instead of a blessing this (500 acre provision)
has proved a curse to the island. Porto Ricans
were too poor to develop the land themselves and
what was needed most was foreign capital. But
capital was unwilling to go to Porto Rico under
these restrictions... In the light of its results,
it is eminently desirable that this harmful restric-
tion at once be removed.”^
Guided by this feeling that the limitation was at least
ill-advised, a number of serious attempts were made in Con-
gress to remove the 500 acre provision from the Organic Act.
In 1910 when a new Organic Act was being considered, Puerto
Rican and American interests testified to the unworkable
nature of the land law. No change was made in the Foraker
Act at that session but when in 1917 Congress was ready to
grant American citizenship to Puerto Ricans and considerably
liberalize the basic law of the Island, it specifically re-
tained the 500 acre provision in Article 39 in the new Jones
Act. This new Organic Act has been since that time the in-
terpretative basis for all insular legislation and serves in
7
lieu of a Constitution, a rather anomolous situation. The
500 acre provision was thus firmly established as the law of
the island despite all attempts to remove it, all arguments
offered against it, and all the resultant bad effects claimed
against It.
Q^orge^ilt^n. Fowle^^ .Present Conditions in the Island of PortRico, ( New York, pub1infeed doc-tor^y 3 'geTtatttTfti' TTf TygremfoTg
—
Umv. 1906) pp. 136-137.
It has been held that the . Jonej
course and as such is subject i Act is the law of final re-;o amendment by Congress alone.
.
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The Foraker Act ( 1900 )
The Organic Act of 1900 was admittedly experimental. A
new problem, that of administering a territory well organized
already, an island whose language and culture was Spanish, and
of fitting that territory into the economic life of the country
as a whole without doing damage to insular economy, faced the
Congressmen of a newly imperial United States. That this first
act to provide civil government for the Island did not fully
succeed in all its purposes, and that there was constant agita-
tion in Puerto Rico to have it amended or removed, is not a
cause for wonder.
The Congress and those given the problem of governing the
Island during this early period, both military and civil, were
convinced that their first problem was to prepare the Puerto
Rican for a more active part in his own government and in that
of the United States. Being fundamental in their thinking,
they could not conceive of a people truly independent and self-
governing who were dominated by large landed and moneyed in-
terests. No evidence could convince the Congressmen that capi-
talistic agriculture might in this case be best for the people
as a whole and might bring up the level of living standards on
the Island. The myth of the superiority of a small landholding
economy still held their fancy. Myth it was, insofar as Puerto
Rico was concerned for even. at the beginning of the twentieth
century there were less than two acres of tillable land per
person. Because of the inefficient types of agricultural
5
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exploitation followed the small farms in existence at the begin
ning of American rule used labor excessively so that the exis-
tence of a small farm system did not mean that land was already
well distributed. In fact those who did hold farms of any size
were regarded highly in their communities and were often descen
dants of royal landgrantees. A great deal of the land lay in
an uncultivated state, especially on the south coast where irri
gation would be necessary to build up a prosperous agriculture.
To have distributed the land, then, to all possible users would
have been almost as difficult a task as it appears now. The
reality of the Puerto Rican land situation is that land has
never been well parceled and that there has always been a ten-
dency toward concentration. Continuation in this direction was
not contrary to the trends already noticeable.
The early island administrators faced with the implementa-
tion of the Congressional will found a very real dilemma. If
the 500 acre provision were to be firmly adhered to, these men
were convinced that it could not mean real gain to the Island.
The announced aims of the Congress to improve the Puerto Rican
economy demanded a means of accomplishment contrary to the
policies of Congress, it was felt. In the annual report of the
governor for 1902, the following is found:
"The principle which would prevent a few corpora-
tions from acquiring unlimited quantities of cane lands,
perhaps all in P uerto Rico, is a salutory one, but on
the other hand, to confine ownership to tracts of 500
acres is to encounter the danger of a limitation which
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may retard development through the usual means of
corporate organization*" 8
The governor, far from Washington and of little influence
there, could only mildly protest the rather arbitrary action
of Congress* However, the power to enforce the law insofar as
it rested in hands of the governor was not used during this
early period*
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in 1913 when presented
9
with a trial case involving the land limitation law ruled that
it must he enforced. An insular registrar of property was sued
for negligence in registering the holdings of corporations in
excess of the 500 acre limitation* The decision of the high
court was that the intention of the Congress to limit land
concentration was binding upon all officials of the insular
government and that the insular Attorney General had the task
of enforcement. This case did little more than rattle a skele-
ton in a forgotten, purposely so, closet.
Since the policy of the government was to ignore the 500
acre limitation, seeing no other way out of the dilemma, it
was natural that land concentration should rapidly grow during
the period of the Foraker Act (1900 to 1917). Capital poured
into the Island and land values shot up. Sugar production in-
creased phenomenally, almost threefold in the 17-year period.
The acreage harvested in canelands rose from an average of
0Governor of Porto Rico, Second Annual Report, (San Juan, 1902)
p * . ——
—
9
Compania Azucarera v. the Registrar 19 P.R.R. 724
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70,000 to an average of 227,000 in 1917, The price of raw
sugar in the New York market from a little over three cents
at the turn of the century rose to well over six cents per
pound in the war years. Sugar was increasingly profitable.
The land law's subversion was apparently not an injury to
Puerto Rico and no one made an active protest. In fact, land
concentration in the sugar industry seemed to bring increasing
benefits as the standard of living rose.'1'0
By 1917 there were 477 individuals, partnerships, and
corporations possessing holdings of agricultural land in excess
of 500 acres. These entities owned in the agregate 537,193
acres, or over 26> of all the rural land upon the assessors
rolls. They held by lease in addition over 123,000 acres, so
that the total area under their control exceeded 37^ of the
lands reported for taxation. Since the average value of those
lands was over |>143 per acre, as compared with an average of
$53 for the entire Island, the 477 holders owned nearly one
third, and controlled through ownership and lease together
over one half of the assessed capital land value of Puerto Rico
Such was the amount of land concentration at the end of the
31
first period of insular administration.
10
Some economists point out that the turn of the century marked
the end of any possibility of self sufficiency on the Island,
Other Latin American countries arrived at the same crossroad
unable to face the future but the development of a new indus-
try has allowed Puerto Rico to continue to progress far faster
than most of its neighbors.
^This information is taken from the survey of Puerto Rican orob
lems by the Brookings Institution. See Victor S. Clark & Ass,
op . cit
.
,
p. 495 et seqq.
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Jones Act ( 1917)
Congress was either blissfully unaware of the extent of
concentration of land ownership in 1917 or more firmly con-
vinced than ever that such a state was an unhealthy one for
12
the small island. Constant insular representations led by
l'i
1
Luis Munoz Rivera, Puerto Rican High Commissioner in Congress,
had stressed the failings of the Foraker Act and the need for
a more democratic and responsible form of government and the
Jones Act was essentially an answer to these requests. It did
not fully satisfy all Puerto Ricans but it was a step forward
and in the right direction. The 500 acre provision was now
incorporated into the insular "constitution. " However, no change
in the insular administrations policy of non-enforcement oc-
curred and the trend toward increased holdings in fewer hands
continued without respite.
1917 was a pivotal year in Ruerto Rican economics as well
as in politics. Between that year and 1920 the price of raw
sugar already twice the standard of half a generation before
doubled, reaching an average of 12.3 cents per pound in the
latter year. Puerto Rico with all other sugar producing areas
became a veritable paradise of opportunity and the greatest
12
A survey of the Congressional debates for this period shows
very little discussion of this question. Only one senator
actively espoused the provision but he also demanded an ad-
ditional provision to nave all who held more than 500 acres
in 1917 divested of their holdings. He did not succeed in
this. latter purpose and. the 500 acre provision was incorporat-
ed without change and without debate. See R.G. Tugwell, Puert
Rican Public Papers (San Juan, 1945) p. 303 et seqq.
13He had also been representative of P.R. to the Spanish Cortes,
and was until death in 1916 leader of the Union Party.
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period of Puerto Rican prosperity came during these years* Of
course, larger holdings resulted* The small farmer who still
had held onto his land was now able to get a very attractive
price for it and he disposed of it during these years of flush.
Two Puerto Rican scholars have attempted to find out why
the small farmer was so anxious to sell his land and their con-
clusions are quoted here.
"The greater part of our land is very "badly dis-
tributed. Corporations, banks, and rich proprietors
possess most of the agricultural land of Puerto Rico*
From the time when the growing of sugarcane was inten-
sified in the Island, our small farmers began to lose
their lands. Why were these small holders deprived
of their holdings? At times hurricanes destroyed
their farms and floods destroyed their harvests. In
order to plant they needed to borrow money in order
to keep on working. When the price of their crops,
especially cane, was low, they couldn’t pay their
debts. They kept on borrowing and day by day their
situation grew worse. Finally they sold their farms
in order to be able to pay their debts or they sur-
rendered them to the corporations, banks, or rich
proprietors... Others attracted by prices that for
the moment seemed very good sold their property. "14
The sale of land to large corporations was not only true
of the small holders but a number of large holders also disposed
of their land and moved to the city. It is felt by some that
had there been a land bank in operation such as was later es-
tablished much of this sale of land to large holders might have
been prevented and small holders could have improved their com-
petitive position. Be that as it may, debts did drive some to
dispose of their land or cause them otherwise to lose it.
14
Francisco Gaztambide Vega and Pedro P. Aran, translated from
La Isla de Puerto Rico (New York: Rand McNally y Cia, 1942),
p . 56
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However, the overall effect was not obvious for the number of
individual farmers remained more or less unchanged as the popu-
lation increased.
So long as the price of sugar continued high there was no
general complaint and certainly no one in power spoke of the
Island as a problem for the United States. There had been
rumblings against monoculture and maldistribution of sugar in-
15
come, but these had been ignored. With the fall in the price
of sugar after 1923 to a low of 2.9 cents on an average at the
New York market in 1932 all became aware of the rather tenuous
position of the Island’s economy. Whereas before the ascen-
dancy of sugar, other sizable sources of income were present,
both coffee and tobacco obtaining relatively high world prices,
by 1932 there was little tobacco and coffee culture. Sven if
there had been the price of these commodities had fallen with
the rest. Since before American occupation Puerto Rico had
16
not produced sufficient food to support her own people. Ob-
viously no immediate change could be made toward insular self-
sufficiency.
Harbingers of evil tidings were ready to affirm that the
emphasis on sugar production had been a tragic mistake.
"Nothing has been more disappointing or decep-
tive to Porto Rico than the sugar business. The
superficial glance at the pyramiding production in
tons and dollars has made it seem a veritable cascade
of riches. The millions made from sugar have given
15
A report from Gen. McIntyre, the chief of the War Dept’s Bureau
of Insular Affairs in 1924 said in part:
...The profit of sugar growers in Porto Rico,
was, measured by any rule, excessive and a reasonable
increase of wages should not have been the product of
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the false Impression of a prosperous Porto Rico, when
the truth is that the majority of the people of the
island are actually “being forced further into debt
day by day. This is now known. The industry does
not belong to natives but to outsiders. The profits
are not enjoyed by those who make them possible, but
by those who never see Porto Rico. The wages, which
in bulk are so large, are now known to be miserably
inadequate for the sustenance of life. Sugar has
supplanted food crops by usurping the fertile valley
lands. Sugar interests have taken charge of the
Legislature and of the Bureau of Insular Affairs
and have rendered the people impotent to help them-
selves. However glittering the sugar industry may
appear to outsiders, the Porto Ricans know that it
has not paid. "Sugar Economy" has proved to be
"bad economy.
Whatever the truth of this allegation, it was becoming increas-
ingly obvious to the most hardy supporter of the sugar economy
that there was active popular demand for a change.
Puerto Rico is to a greater extent than most Americans and
Puerto Ricans realize an integral part of the national life.
Thus the election of an American President pledged to a "New
Deal" could not but have some effect on Puerto Rico. The full
effect in this change in the direction of the American govern-
ment we will discuss later, but it is interesting to note that
the change when it did come came from Washington and not from
San Juan.
15 (Cont.) a strike but of a little enlightened self-
ishness on the part of the cane growers." Quoted
in B.W. and J.W. Diffie, Porto Rico: Broken Pledge,
(New York: Vanguard, 1931) p. 4TT
16
The War Department conducted census of the island in 1899
reported that in 1897 50^ of the food used on the island had
been imported.
17
B. W. and J. W. Diffie, 0£. cit . , p. 88
..
.
ji
<
.
.
- %
•
'
.
-
,
.
,
.
t ' : :
.
.
v-
.
; . . ,
.
.
.
.
- • •
.
.
:
.
.
.
*
42
Enforcement Prior to 1935
It must have "been the Congressional intention to have the
500 acre law enforced. No other conclusion can be drawn from
a study of the record of the debates which gave rise to it.
It is generally supposed that the reason that no enforcement
machinery or specific punishments were included in the Organic
Acts of 1900 and of 1917 was that the Congress was aware that
it was formulating a "constitution" for the Island and consti-
tutions being basic laws do not go into detail about punish-
ments. Perhaps this is true but it is certain that the enforce-
ment of the law has been handicapped by a lack of definite
opinion as to how severe the punishment should be.
Opinion also differs as to why Congress insisted on this
provision. Some say that the reason was a desire to aid Span-
ish landholders as against American corporate interests. This
interpretation is very unlikely for we cannot suppose that the
Congress having just successfully completed a war against Spain
should be generous in assisting Spaniards. That the effect of
the law was to aid Spanish landholders is directly traceable
to the fact that Spanish holdings were generally personal and
as such were not interdicted under the provision directed so
specifically against corporate ownership. The more reasonable
explanation is that, as has been intimated, Congress was still
heavily engaged in a battle against industrial combinations and
the most common of these combinations being corporations it was
perfectly natural that they should seek to prevent their gain-
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ing a stranglehold on the new Island possession.
Why was not the law enforced? First, as we have seen the
general tendency of the first island administrators was to
deplore the lav/ and adopt a policy of non-enforcement. Sugar
capital, assured by capable lawyers both American and Puerto
Rican that the law would never be enforced, was not slow in
being obtained in New York and Boston,
There are other more earthy reasons than any implied
policy of non-enforcement which explain the failure to enforce
the restriction. The legislators of the Puerto Rican House
and Senate and members of all the principal parties stood to
gain from the growth of the sugar industry. Thus Antonio R,
Barcelo, from 1917 until his death leader of the Union Party
and until 1930 the President of the insular Senate was a bro-
ther-in-law to Jorge gird Arias, Vice President and General
Manager of the Fajardo Sugar Company, the largest in eastern
Puerto Rico, Jose Tous Soto, for many years during the 20’
s
and 30* s speaker of the House was during his term of office
also attorney for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company, the very
largest on the Island and operator of the giant central at
Guanica. A very blunt observer of island conditions could say
"The underlying reason why no effort has been
made by the Legislature to enforce the 500 acre pro-
vision is easily discovered. The leaders of the body
have always been too closely and too profitably tied
up with the sugar industry to be free to do so, 11^
18
B.W. and J.W. Diffie, op. cit
. , p, 71,
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We could not be entirely fair with Puerto Ricans in gene-
ral if we did not admit that among the intelligent thinking
men and women there was a general conviction that the produc-
tion of sugar was best for the Island and in reality the only
way the Island could survive. It was axiomatic and has remained
so without challenge that sugar must be produced on a large
19
scale to be profitable,
A University student expressing his opinion in 1934 could
say with sincerity:
"Ido not believe the enforcement of the Act
(500 acre law) would be economical. Concentration
of the industry allows for better control and
economy. " 20
while a very scholarly report made on the sugar economy of the
Island said authoritatively in 1938:
"The present situation is the response to the play
of economic factors in a situation where the princi-
ple of private enterprise has operated fully. No seri-
ous effort has ever been made by any political group
to limit freedom in acquiring lands. What agitation
there has been has centered about enforcement of the
500 acre law. This agitation has been fruitless,
partly because of a lack of conviction in Puerto Rico
that the law itself was either desirable or enforceable."
19
The now famous Brookings Institution report on Puerto Rican
conditions alleges in defense of large scale production that
in all other aheas except Java where an entirely different
system of land exploitation obtains, this method alone has
proved successful. See V.S. Clark and Associates, op. cit
.
,
pp. 628-641. —
20
S. A. Gonzalez, Present Economic Problems of Puerto Rico .
(Boston: unpublished M.B.A. thesis for Boston Univ.
,
1934)
pp. 16-17.
21
A. D. Gayer, P.T. Homan, S.K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto
Rico (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1938)
, p. 304.
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A law which is contrary to economic realities will have
an adverse effect on an economy only if it is enforced, al-
though its continued existence among the statics of the land
may serve as a threat to development. Were this analysis to
stop at 1935, it might he concluded that the 500 acre provision
is such a law, hut more recent developments have clearly demon-
strated either the foresight of the Congress in 1900, a doubt-
ful conclusion in view of the facts, or the resourcefulness of
the Puerto Ricans themselves who have tried an entirely new
solution to their problem. This solution, the setting up of
a government corporation to take over land held in excess of
the 500 acre limitation, means, not a change in the method of
exploitation, nor a change in management hut merely a change
in ownership with a view to better distribution of the income
from sugar.
Full consideration will be given to the land policy of the
Popular Democratic Party in a later chapter but here it can be
pointed out that the 500 acre law has not been without its uses.
It is to be wondered, however, how some of the more ardent sup-
porters of the original Joint Resolution might feel about this
very clever adaptation of their law so as to abide by the let-
ter of it while at the same time voiding its spirit.
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CHAPTER IV
ATTEMPTS AT LAND REFORM PRIOR TO 1935
nThe American flag found Puerto Rico penniless and content.
It now flies over a prosperous factory worked by slaves who
have lost their lands and may soon lose their guitars and
their songs." Luis MufSoz Marfn (from a public statement
frequently referred to in the island press)
••
-
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If an emotional approach to the land problem in Puerto
Rico be avoided, it will be seen that the essence of the mal-
adjustment there lies in the fact that fifty years of American
rule with the resultant orientation of the insular economy
toward the metropolitan country and the concentrated monocul-
ture in sugar have completely changed Puerto Rican mores, habits
and attitudes toward land without compensating for that change.
Remembering that Puerto Rico is an island with few resources
of value for the American market other than a location in the
tropics, an abundant labor supply and one other, that the War
Department has never lost sight of, a strategic position in
the outer ring of Panama Canal Defenses, it can be pointed out
that the readjustment thus far achieved has been extraordinary
if proper comparisons be made."*"
The Chamber of Commerce of Puerto Rico published in the San
Juan Puerto Rico World Journal, the only English language daily
on the island (and since defunct) in 1944 the following compara
tive figures which are averages for the years 1941-1944:
1,986,421
^116,352,408
?107, 281,799
P 183
Population
Imports
Exports
Per Capita Income
National Income
(Total earnings) $362,500,000
Radio Sets per 1000
Motor Vehicles per
1000 persons
Mech Refrigerators
per 1000 persons
Assessed Value Real „
Estate per 1000 persa
32phaXp for EdU0 pe#
Govt Exp for Health
per capita $
43
14
16
181
6.34
Cuba
4,293,556
$121 , 568,355
$217,357,706
$ 106
$455,058,000
17
Jamalca
1,294,389
$ 23,988,352
$ 19,482,691
$ 89
$115,628,000
14
$
3.93
5.7
3.5
121 $
3.12 $
1.65 $
3.9
2.3
52
1.13
.54
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Alfred Marshall once said that land and the use it is put
to
"is a primary condition of everything that man
can do. It gives him room for his own actions, for
the enjoyment of the heat and the light, the air
and the rain which nature assigns to that area, and
it determines his distance from and, in a great mea-
sure, his relation to other things and other persons"^
The traditional element in land usage is important in under-
standing Puerto Rican land tenure. Landed status was the basis
for aristocratic supremacy in Spain and the holding of land
carries with it, even today, honorific benefits above and be-
yond whatever economic good may be derived from that land. The
loss of landed status, or the impairment of the benefits of
such status, in addition to its strictly economic aspects,
has profound emotional repercussions in a country where proprie-
torship and social status have been historically linked. This
would be especially true in Puerto Rico where the alternative
routes to wealth and influence are few. Add to this a sense
of grievance, whether justified or not, arising out of the man-
ner in which the sugar interests came to control the land and
it can be understood that the land question is more than an
economic one. S
2Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics
,
(1938 ed. ) , p. 195
"No people ever had a collective fondness for
carpetbaggers, and aside from any matter of merit
or deserts, it would be quite natural for a kind
of uncomplicated and unreasonable resentment to
color all the attitudes of Islanders toward out-
J
iders who had acquired control of much good land.
n consequence of the rapid growth of a landless
population and of the low standard of living im-
posed by failure to make industrial advances, there
had come to be a dangerous proletarian psychology
which was separate from--yet related to--absentee
ownership* The materials for a class war were all
i
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To be of political importance an economic problem in a
democracy must affect all sections of the populace with a like
degree of urgency or must affect a powerful group with a very
great amount of emphasis. An underlying sense of injustice
tends to increase the support that will be given to any program
designed to solve economic problems. So long, however, as all
sections of the populace can see some gain whether real or
imagined from the present course of events, political programs
directed against the trend will not in general be successful.
A sense of injustice has long been felt by the Puerto Rican
masses with regard to the land situation but so long as sugar
was profitable and the trend of economic affairs seemed definite-
ly progressive even the lowest peon who voted supported those
leaders who favored sugar. In fact, until the depression no
party had done more than issue polemics against "land concentra-
tion and absenteeism. " The issue was a good one for argument but
not for action.
By 1932 the jibaro, the propietarios
,
moradores de los
pueblos, campesinos, ricos y pobres, in short, a great majority
of Puerto Ricans were ready for a change. At this juncture the
strongest political party, the Partido Socialista, in its conven-
tion in August of 1932 at Mayaghez bound itself to the approval of
3
(cont.) present. But if there were going to be a liqui-
dation it was evident that first attention would
be given to the "foreigners" rather than to equally
exploitative native capitalists and landlords."
Rexford Guy Tugwell, Stricken Land (New York: Double-
day, 1947), p. 7.
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"punitive legislation to make effective Article 3
of the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United
States, approved May 1, 1900, and ratified in Para-
graph 39 of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, limiting
the possession and operation of land by corporations
to 500 acres."
The Socialist Party, if socialist at all in the sense in which
we generally conceive of socialism, certainly was very mildly
so. It was, in general, as it had been from its founding in
1912, a laborers* party started as a protest against the domi-
nation of the Union and the Republican parties by the corpora-
tions, and to give a voice to the landless masses. Its leaders
were moderate men, as Puerto Ricans go, perhaps too moderate
for later developments, and without a definite program for the
future of the Island. Perhaps these men were realistic in their
awareness of the fact that the real source of power in the Is-
land lay in Washington or as some cynically observed, in
bankers' offices in New York and Boston.
Developments came fast and thick after this first coura-
geous announcement by a group of Puerto Rican leaders that the
500 acre law, so long a dead letter, ought to be enforced. The
full course of these developments better fit into the story as
unfolded in Chapters Four and Five. Yet credit can be given
here to the Socialist party for the part played by that now
(1947) almost extinct organization in setting into motion a
trend which perhaps bids well for the future of the insular
economy
i
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Enforcement of Basic Laws
Very little was done prior to 1935 to make effective the
provisions of laws already on the books dealing with land
tenure. Especially is this true as we have seen of the 500
acre provision in the insular ’’constitution" • There were, how-
4
ever, at least four instances when the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico was called upon to give an opinion regarding the 500 acre
law during the years between 1900 and 1935. It had also the
burden in these cases of deciding means of enforcement. All
the cases turned about the refusal of the Registrar of Puerto
Rico to complete his records and to list all the land held by
corporations in excess of the statutory limitation. Clever
5lawyers ,who had advised investors and management that no en-
forcement of the law was likely, had also advised their clients
to avoid difficulty by failing to register their holdings in
full. Thus a number of Puerto Rican companies openly ignored
the law and acquired lands in their corporate names avoiding
0however the required registration. Other companies both
4
Baet.jer v. Registrar
.
48 P.R.R. 628, 645
Isabella Grove v. Registrar 24 P.R.R. 240
Puerto Rican Leaf Tobacco Company v. Registrar 24 g.R.R. 245
Compania Azucarera v. The Registrar!9 P.R.R. 724
5
It is^not possible. , .to do more than suggest the reasons
for this wholesale violation of the law. It must, of course,
have been on the advice of counsel. It is difficult to be-
lieve that these aggregations of capital did not have good
reason for feeling safe, for accepting the theory that the
law was a dead letter and would never be enforced." Quoted
from R.G. Tugwell’ s "Report on the Five Hundred Acre Law."
See R.G. Tugwell, Puerto Rican Public Papers (San Juan 1945).
pp. 303 et seqq.
6
Cf. Gayer et al., o£. cit
.
,
p. 93.
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American and Puerto Rican resorted to non-corporate agencies
of tenure, usually in the form of limited partnerships not
nominally related to the milling corporations.
In one of these cases, that of Compania Azucarera v. the
7
Registrar, tried in 1913, the court had said.
52
"A corporation limited by the law or by its
charter has until the State acts every power that
any other individual capable of acquiring lands
possessess. . . The provisions of law in Porto Rico
are no different. The Foraker Act does not pro-
hibit the acquisition of land, but says that a
corporation engaged in agriculture shall by its
charter be restricted to the ownership and control
of not to exceed 500 acres... The Organic Act in
section 21 provides that the Attorney General will
have all the pov/er and discharge all the duties pro-
vided by law for an attorney of the territories of
the United States... Ample provision is made in the
law by which any violation of the Organic Act may be
thoroughly investigated and prosecuted by the Attor-
ney General... (who) is the exclusive officer in
whom is confided the right to initiate proceedings
for each at or attach the right of a corporation to
hold land. Without some such judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding a corporation might be deprived
of some of its property rights without due process
of law."®
These actions significantly enough were not brought by an
agent of the Insular administration but by citizens who saw
defiance of the law in the action of the agents of the govern-
ment. They did have effect for in these proceedings was laid
legal groundwork for later enforcement actions under braver
and more sincere administrations.
Homestead Commission 1921
Positive legislation designed to achieve at least a small
7
i c i t
.
8
Ibid.
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measure of land reform is of comparatively long standing in
Puerto Rico. The first ]a w passed after 1900 to make any
change at all in land holding was one providing for the creation
of small farms by the state. The act of 11 June 1921 was a
recognition of the very real land hunger of the Puerto Rican
masses but characteristically it made no attempt to enforce
the Organic Act's land provision, seeking on the contrary to
approach the problem of land from an entirely new front.
There was established a Homestead Commission empowered to
create workingmen's settlements in insular cities, to build
houses for artisans and laborers, to create small farms to be
leased to farm labroers, and to grant them title thereto. The
stated purpose of the small farms program was to provide an
independent living for the holders.
The program, insofar as it had gone by 1935, was an excel-
lent one but its effect on Puerto Rican economy as a whole was
negligible. Figures for the period prior to the present show
a total of 2,074 small farms established up to June 30, 1942
9
aggregating a total of 24,459 cuerdas. Unfortunately, many
of the farms were established in remote interior regions where
the soil was of low productivity. There is no doubt, however,
that a considerable improvement in the plane of living of for-
merly landless workers was realized by settling them on these
farms despite the smallness of most of them. Such an improve-
ment was especially noticeable in those areas which were rela-
tively productive and accessible. 10
q
From official data of the Homestead Division of the Puerto
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Joint Resolution No. 47 of May 15, 1933 and Law No. 250
of May 15, 1938 abolished the Homestead Commission and its
functions, duties, and powers were transferred to the Homestead
Division of the Insular Department of Labor. Law No. 83 of
May 8, 1945 abolished the Homestead Division of the Department
of Labor and transferred to the Land Authority of Puerto Rico
all the rights which the Homestead Division had over the Home-
stead farms together with funds, documents, and files. An in-
complete survey being made in 1946 revealed a total of 38,000
XL
cuerdas with some 2,341 plots and a total value of $279,608.89.
Private Undertakings
Americans are convinced that they have the very best way
of life and very little prompting is necessary to get them to
go on civilizing missions to benighted lands. Add to this drive
the sincere desire of the Christian churches to carry the gos-
pel to "every nation, kindred, tongue and people." American
military men spoke in glittering terms of the new freedom that
they had brought to Puerto Rico but missionaries of the Protes-
tant churches actually laid the groundwork for a new concept
of personal freedom. They pointed to a Saviour, not a system.
9 (cont. ) Rican Department of Labor. Cf. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,
"Land Problems in Puerto Rico and in the Philippine Islands",
Geographical Review (New York) 24:182 et seqq.
10
J. B* McCord. and. S.L. Descartes, "A Farm Management Study ofSmall Farms in Three Areas or Puerto Rico , University ox Puert
Rico, Agricultural Experiment Station Bulle 'ltre5~
11
Reported in a statement issued for the press on August 2, 1946by Alberto Arrillaga, Chief, Article 25 (Homestead) Division,
Land Authority of Puerto Rico.
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The effect of this new approach to religion cannot be overem-
phasized and is partly responsible for the active support that
the average Puerto Rican is giving to a courageous government.
There is not space or time to devote to all the missionary
activities of the various churches nor to discuss any one of
them in detail but their work is of sufficient importance to
mention them and their very important part in bringing hope to
downtrodden masses. Physical evidence of the sincere desire
of Americans to aid their Puerto Rican brethren is to be found
in the experimental farms maintained by a small group of Penn-
sylvania churchmen, by hospitals in widely separated spots in
the islands, by schools like the very famous Polytechnic Insti-
tute at San German where young Puerto Ricans are being taught
to take actiye part in rebuilding their island and being given
courage to do it. This last named school has excellently manned
agricultural and manual training departments. Its graduates
are to be found in all walks of Puerto Rican life.
While the University of Puerto Rico is in reality a govern-
ment entity, it has the attributes of a private enterprise in
that its policies represent and have represented not the will
of the American governor but that of the trustees and students.
At the University 1 s Agricultural Experiment stations in Rio
Piedras and Mayaguez, at the College of Agriculture and Mechani-
cal Arts at Mayaguez, a great deal has been done to further the
production of Puerto Rican farms and to train capable agronomists.
' J
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The effect of these early efforts at land reform were per-
haps so small as to he relatively insignificant. The beginning
—
the necessary experimental base--had been made. There were in-
creasing numbers of trained experts who were aware of what was
being done and what could be done. Small farmers and agregados
here and there were being introduced to new more productive uses
of land.
There was a general will for reform prior to 1935 and a
desire to implement that will. Puerto Rico had to await positive
action from her rulers in Washington before that reform could
begin. 1935 was however a turning point.
..
.
.
.
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CHAPTER V
THE NEW DEAL TAKES A HAND
’’Let us take a more intelligent interest in our beautiful
possession ... and try to bring about wherever our flag flies
conditions of which we can be proud.” Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
(1934), ”Our Island Possessions”, Woman ’ s Home Companion
(Oct. 1934), p. 4.
. J
. , .
There came an abrupt change in policy with regard to Puerto
Rico after the inauguration of President Roosevelt's "New Deal,"
A casual observer would probably have said that the change was
to have been expected but his observation, while accurate in
some respects, would have failed to take into account the true
nature of the change. First, let it be said that perhaps there
was no real change from the original governmental intentions
toward the island but rather a belated but necessary attempt
to right wrongs foreseen by the earliest American administrators
Not to account for the very vociferous, dog-at-the-heel opposi-
tion of the sugar plantation owners and operators and their sup-
porters in the old line parties, in the insular legislature and
in Congress, would be to fail to give proper weight to very
strong retarding influences. Add to these the personal equation
a bewildering combination of Presidential visits. Congressional
surveys, privately financed investigations of the Island's re-
i
sources, the political situation in the Island and the rumbling
discontent of the landless Puerto Rican masses.
If a reason or reasons of immediate importance to explain
the change in the handling of Puerto Rican affairs in Washing-
ton, were to be sought, first it might be observed that a physi-
cal change took place in 1934. The long existant Bureau of In-
sular Affairs in the War Department was discontinued and there
was set up in the Department of the Interior a Division of Terri-
tories and Insular Possessions.^
.O.J*
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The Island’s affairs Insofar as the power to control them lay In
2
Washington were now In the hands of civilian as contrasted with
military bureaucrats --a term used not to imply a condemnation
but describe a fact. It is not the writer’s purpose to attempt
a critique of the War Department’s policy toward the Island ex-
cept to add a statement to ones then generally expressed to the
effect that the sugar interests of New York and Boston had per-
haps too easy an entrance to the offices of the old Bureau of
"Division of territories and Possessions created in the Depart-
ment of the Interior by Executive Order 6726 dated May 29, effec-
tive July 29, 1934, issued under authority of Act approved
March 3, 1934 (47 Stat 1517, 40 U.S.C. 278a)
"The division under the supervision of the Secretary
of the Interior is the principal Federal agency responsi-
ble for the development of territorial policy for advis-
ing the President and the Congress on all aspects of ter-
ritorial policy. It acts as liaison between the terri-
tories and all branches of the Federal government and the
general public, explaining the territorial viewpoint, pro-
tecting the territorial interests insofar as they do not
conflict with Federal interests, encouraging industrial
development and acting as an informational clearing house
for Federal officials and private persons, associations,
and organizations interested in business, commerce, trade
or travel. It assists the territorial areas in working
out plans and policies for a stable economy and a politi-
cal status satisfactory to the inhabitants. It aids in
the drafting of legislation to be introduced and the ter-
ritorial legislature or in Congress. It represents the
territories in litigation on appeal in the Federal courts,
and in proceedings before Federal administration agencies.
It supplies financial and administrative services for the
territorial governments in connection with personal records
and with the preparation of annual budget estimates to the
Congress." U.S. Gov. Manual 1947
Former Insular Governor Tugwell in his rather cumbersome account
of his stay in Puerto Rico has this to say about the transfer
of insular affairs to the Department of tne Interior,
"... in all the discussions of reorganization there was
never any question about territories and possessions.
It was obvious to him (President Roosevelt) as to me
that it ought not to be in the War Department
. • . and
the State Department some of whose functionaries felt
it should be there, was as obviously not suitable ...
..
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Insular Affairs* If only because the favor of new officials
3
had to be curried a change had occurred.
Of greater significance than might appear at first was
the visit of the wife of the new president, Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt to the Island in March of 1934. To the lame president
his wife was an "alter ego." She went where he couldn ! t go
and made surveys of the problems he was interested in. Her
bisit to Puerto Rico was not just another winter tour, for
she had brought with her, experts from several of the executive
departments in Washington and Rexford Guy Tugwell, professor
of economics at Columbia University, one of the so-called
"brain trusters." She apparently had come for a purpose.
Puerto Ricans were not quite sure what she wanted. "Survey of
Puerto Rican Problems" had come to be so synonomous with a
two-week vacation in the tropics for tired government investi-
gators that the matter of surveys was a current joke in the
Island.
Professor Tugwell announced to the press that he planned
to make another
"survey of the island T s economic conditions
with special reference to these questions:
how soon Puerto Rico under a careful, unified
2 (Cont.) The residual choice was obviously Interior. So
to Interior the transfer was made in 1934. And
Mr. Ickes became the nearest thing we had to a
Colonial Secretary." "Stricken Land", New York,
1947, p. 3.
3
Members of the House and Senate Committee on Public Lands
have been recently described as the "real rulers of ruerto
RicoV Cf . J. M. Jones, "Let*s Begin with Puerto Rico"Fortune
.
May 1944. *
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plan would be able to produce the major part of
the food products its people consume ... the
better use of all sorts of land ... (and) methods
for putting these plans into effect." 4
Evidently the President wanted first hand information on the
insular economy and had sent his most respected advisors to
size up the problem.
While Tugwell and his battery of experts dug into their
research project, Mrs. Roosevelt unobtrusively gadded about
the Island. Islanders discovered that she spoke fair Spanish
and read the language fluently. To the perplexed insular
authorities prepared to conduct an official itinerary, she
politely said no and with a woman assistant saw at first hand
much of the Island. Observing her unorthodox insistence on
seeing what was what, a Puerto Rican correspondent of a main-
land magazine wrote,
"There appears to be considerable reason to
hope that Mrs, Roosevelt will take away more than
a superficial impression of the beauty and the
economic distress of the island." 5
What her impression was, Mrs. Roosevelt told her nationwide
audience of readers in the Woman’s Home Companion in the fall,
"We are last waking up to the fact that a long
term plan must be made out for this island (Puerto
Rico), and it is at present being worked out by a
group of experts including all the government de-
partments concerned and a committee of Puerto Ricans
themselves .
"
6
4
Reported in the Christian' Century
, April 4, 1934 (Vol. 51,p.47
5Ibid.
6
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, "Our Island Possessions," Woman’s
Home Companion
.
Vol. 61 (Oct. 1934), p. 4.
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—Islanders waited with expectation for the next step to he taken
in Washington certain now that Mrs. Roosevelt had reported to
the President what she had seen. An island observer could say
in the spring of 1934,
"There seems to be a new government policy for
Puerto Rico, perhaps a new deal." 7
Of more immediate importance to Puerto Rico than the re-
port of the Tugwellian experts or the first hand impressions
of the Presidents wife was the favorable attitude toward that
Island held by the new Secretary of the Interior, Mr.. Harold
Ickes, Mrs. Ickes, whom few will accuse of softheartedness,
was familiar by training with many social and economic problems
and was predisposed to favor a new approach to insular affairs.
There was no inside channel to his office. He appeared to
make his own mind up about insular policies and New York and
Boston interests were to find him intractable in the face of
their pleas for assistance against insular government actions.
Harold Ickes, during his long term of office stood firmly be-
hind all feasible attempts to right the wrongs of the insular
8
economy.
In early 1935 when the Tugwell group had submitted its
confidential report to the President and Mr. Ickes, the Interior
Department announced a new land program for the Island. The
500 acre law was to be enforced. In the same year a bill was
7
Christian Century
, op. cit.
,
p. 478.
Q
For a discussion of Mr. Ickes* difficulties with successive
Puerto Rican governors, see Stricken Land
,
cited above
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Introduced into the insular legislature to give the Insular
Supreme Court, original jurisdiction to hear, under "quo
warranto” proceedings, cases involving the land tenure limita-
tions on corporations. Designed to expedite the legal pro-
ceedings necessary to the enforcement of the 500 acre law,
9
this hill became Law No. 33 in August 1935.
To draft a rehabilitation program for Puerto Rico, one
that would serve as a basis for a reconstruction agency, the
President set up a policy commission in 1934, whose report,
best known as the "Chardon Plan”
10
marked a beginning in the
new land program. The Chardo'n Plan met with considerable oppo-
sition when presented to the insular legislature. In turn,
the majority of the legislators belonging to a Coalition of the
Union Republican and Socialist parties submitted their own
11
plan. Published as a concurrent resolution its avowed pur-
pose was to set forth,
”to the President and the Congress of the United States
of America the economic and social evils confronting
the 'People of Puerto Rico* and to point out specific
recommendations for a complete economic-social rehabili-
tation of the Island. "-1-2
10
11
12
The Insular legislature was at that time controlled by a Coali-
tion of the Union Republican and Socialist parties. Sponsors
of the bill, Luis Munoz Marin and Bolivar Pag^n later becamebitter contenders over control of the land reform program.
Munoz won two decisive victories in 1940 and 1944 for his par-
tisans .
Report was work of Carlos E. Chardon, then Chancellor of the
University of Puerto Rico; R. Mendndez Ramos, Commissioner of
Agriculture and Commerce; and R. Fernandez Garcia, then head
of the Department of Chemistry at the University of Puerto Rico
Concurrent Resolution No. 1, Senate of Puerto Rico, dated
February 12, 1935.
Ibid.
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Where there had been previously no planned approach to the
problem of land tenure, now there were two.
In comparing the two, it is to be seen that both called
for a limited redistribution of the holdings of the large
sugar corporations. The Ghardon Plan calling attention to the
"progressive landlessness" as one of the most important economic
problems facing the bulk of the Puerto Rican people, provided
for purchase by the insular government of what was termed
"marginal sugar cane land." On this land, to be retired from
sugar cane culture, 10,000 subsistence farms were to be estab-
lished. An opportunity to purchase "good sugar cane land" in
the lowlands in exchange for their marginal land would be
offered to these growers who sold their holdings to the govern-
ment. The "good sugar cane land" was to be acquired from the
corporations whose production was to be limited by the Jones-
Costigan Act of June 1, 1934 to a specific quota and who as a
result would presumably have little use for many of their
holdings. Also provided for were 8,000 3-acre subsistence
farms in the coffee region, 2,000 2- acre parcels in the fruit
area and 5,000 3-acre plots in the tobacco country, the land
for these subsistence farms to be obtained from the owners at
half price. In return free labor was to be provided for the
rehabilitation of the plantations largely in disrepair in those
areas. The resettlers were to have hurricane resistant houses.
Many costly but necessary services were to be dispensed from
"central farms", these to include farm equipment, seeds, pure-
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bred animals and technical advice.
The Legislative Plan stating as one of its fundamental ob-
jectives the establishment of
"a system for the r ecovery and redistribution of the
land, giving all social classes of our country an
opportunity to obtain and exploit it, according to
their respective ability to make it produce. "13
To this end there were recommended subsistence farms for labor-
ers unable to bear a heavy burden of capitalization, true sub-
sistence farms
"capable of providing for all the needs of the
family with the produce thereof, without need of
the farmer 1 s entering into competition with the
urban population in the field of remunerated occu-
pation ... thus creating many property owners where
today a few control everything. "14
The Homestead Commission was to acquire those farms mortgaged
to the Federal Land Bank then in danger of foreclosure. These
farms subdivided into self-sustaining units, but with a portion
retained for the former owner, were to be leased with the right
to eventual ownership. On them the Homestead Commission was to
be authorized to build dwellings and provide the necessary ferti-
lizer, seeds, animals, and technical aid. The Homestead Com-
mission, according to the plan, would receive $16, 000, 000 of
Federal funds and other benefits from the National Industrial
Recovery Act.
Neither plan was in reality a departure from the Homestead
Commission procedure begun in 1921. The legislative plan calling
13
" Journal
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for expanding the Homestead Commission^ program was perhaps
most popular with the insular politicians for the control
would have remained in their hands but the New Deal proclivity
toward special agencies to carry out special programs was too
strong for the insular legislature. The Puerto Rican Recon-
15
struction Administration was the result.
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration
Created to execute the reconstruction plan outlined by
the Chardon Commission, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Admini-
stration was in a sense imposed on Puerto Rico. An Executive
16
Order set up PRRA over the insular legislature’s protest in
May of 1935, the first step forward in land reform since 1921.
From its analysis of the Puerto Rican situation, the
Chardon Commission had concluded that the chief shortcomings
of the existent sugar economy, insofar as public welfare was
concerned were: (1) "inadequate returns" to farmers and worker
from the operation of the sugar industry; (2) the outflow of
"several million dollars annually as a result of large absentee
holdings"; (3) the "rapid disappearance of the small farmer
group," which was "being absorbed by the corporations"; and
(4) overemphasis on sugar production and consequent insuf-
17ficient production of foodstuffs.
s
PRRA "represented a desire on the part of the Secretary and of
the President to carry out a whole program of reform and re-
habilitation." Rexford G. Tugwell, Stricken Land, op.cit.,p.4.
16
Executive Order No. 7057, dated May 28, 1935
Cf
. Report of the Puerto Rico Policy Commission (Chardon Report
146 pp
. ,
mimeographe'd, 'Washington
-
,
-
L/C.
,
June 14, 1934)~p. 11.
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To remedy these shortcomings the Commission had proposed:
(1) the acquisition of an unspecified number of sugar mills
and their cane lands, with a total production capacity of over
250,000 tons; (2) the leasing of the mills to a semi-public
corporation which would operate them as processors of sugar
cane; (3) exchange of the mill cane lands for marginal cane
lands, owned by farmers in all parts of the Island, the good
cane lands to be divided up into holdings of from forty to
one hundred acres; (4) integration of these small cane growers,
together with independent farmers in the various mill areas,
into production, credit and marketing cooperatives; (5) the es-
tablishment of "colonia centers" to serve the farming and re-
creational needs of the small growers; and (6) the development
of subsistence farms for the workers* All "profits" from the
processing of sugar were to be "a permanent source of funds
18
for social improvement."
In actual operation, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Admini
stration deviated in a number of respects from the general prin
ciples outlined in the Chardo'n Plan described above. In the
field of land reform in the sugar cane region, the original
recommendation that "marginal sugar cane land" should be ac-
quired in exchange for "good sugar cane land" and divided into
18
Ibid., p. 11
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subsistence homesteads was never carried out.^
The acquisition of certain lands and a sugar mill known
as "Central Lafayette" was perhaps the most significant act of
the PRRA in the field of land reform in the sugar cane region.
The Central Lafayette with properties covering three municipali-
ties in the southeastern part of the Island, under French owner-
ship for almost a century, was acquired in December 1936. The
property included a modern raw sugar factory of 2,500 tons daily
grinding capacity, 10,400 acres of land owned and approximately
8,000 additional acres under lease, which were also acquired.
In addition, a railroad, rolling stock, work cattle, and other
20
materials and equipment essential for operation were obtained.
The best lands of this estate in a very productive sugarcane
21
region to a total of 4,560 cuerdas, were divided among twelve
land cooperatives, each composed of holdings of less than 500
19
"While the difficulties encountered in carrying
out the original proposals of the 1 sugar plan* or the
factors that have led to the change, have not been re-
vealed by any authoritative sources, the nature of the
changes effected makes it reasonable to assume that some
of the major obstacles have been the following: (1) the
questionable wisdom of embarking on large scale purchases
of milling properties without smaller-scale preliminary
experimentation: (2) the unlikelihood of finding sugar
mills and cane lands on the market at prices that would
make
, the. scheme economically sound, at a time when the
Puerto Rican sugar industry was recovering from the de-
pression; (3) the inadvisability of having the U. S.
Government directly own sugar mills and plantations;
(4) the difficulty of receiving full titles to farms,
where so large a proportion are mortgaged or their owners
are in debt; (5) general opposition, or lack on enthusi-
asm, on the part of the farmers (colonos) ..." Gayer,
Homan, and Jones, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico
,
Columbia University Press, New York,"T938, p. 2b§.
20
For details see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior
fiscal year ending June 30, 1937, pp. 327-330.
21
See Definitions
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acres to "be eventually owned and managed by the laborers*
Loans for the value of the purchased lands and for operating
capital, guaranteed by a mortgage on the lands and by the
growing crops was made to the cooperatives. To the PRRA was
reserved the right of exercising the voting power of the
laborers’ members. An interconveyance contract made each coop-
erative liable for the debts of the other eleven and all income
and expenses were shared alike, causing them to be operated
in reality as a unit. A manager appointed by PRRA operated the
farms as a result of the Cooperative-PRRA management contract.
By 1939, three years after their initiation, the land
cooperatives found themselves in rather tenuous financial
straits. Although an investigating committee appointed to
look into the affairs of the farms did not feel their failure
to operate profitably to be a necessary result of the type of
organization used, it nevertheless recommended reacquisition of
the lands sold to the cooperatives. This land was to be redi-
vided into as small farms as would be consistent with agricul-
tural efficiency and resold to individual holders. Faulty
financial organization, excessive mortgage indebtedness, low
operating efficiency reflected in high operating costs, low
yields and very high indirect costs, a lack of education general-
ly and the prevailing attitudes of the laborers made the success
of any cooperative in that region doubtful, the investigating
22
committee reported.
22
Cf. Report of the Lafayette Investigating Committee to the
Assistant Administrator of PRRA, Aug. 4, 1940,
69
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Roughly, 4,500 cuerdas were reconveyed to PRRA by the land
cooperatives and distributed into 72 parcels which were sold to
65 different purchasers in lots of from 11.4 cuerdas to 138.9
cuerdas; 315 smaller farms varying from 3.3 cuerdas to 32.5
cuerdas were established on other lands than those originally
sold to the land cooperatives. Also established in the Lafayette
area were some 507 subsistence farms.
On the northern coast of the Island the PRRA made a loan to
a group of colonos (individual sugarcane farmers organized as a
cooperative) for the acquisition of a medium-sized sugar mill
known as "Los Canos." The same group borrowed from a private
bank to acquire the lands about the mill, some 5,466 cuerdas,
and to acquire by lease 1,125 cuerdas in addition. In this
general region the land remaining was distributed to 19 farmers
who bought parcels of from 64 to 552 cuerdas.
That part of the Chardin Plan relating to the establishment
of subsistence farms for laborers in the coffee, tobacco, and
fruit growing regions has been carried out to a considerable
extent. By June 30, 1943 8,457 2 and 3-acre plots had been set
aside in the fruit, tobacco and coffee areas totalling 25,480
cuerdas. In addition, a land distribution program not part of
the original plan has been carried on, so that some 8,754 cuerdas
in different parts of the Island have been divided into 608 farms
of from 4 to 20 cuerdas. On these farm units 1062 subsistence
famrs, almost all one cuerda in size, have been set up. (See
Table to be inserted.)
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Because of the failure of the Congress to approve and. con-
tinue necessary legislation for the Puerto Rico Reconstruction
Administration, the original broad program of rural rehabilita-
tion has, for the past five years, been confined to the protec-
tion of investments already made and conservation of most of
the essential features of its ogiginal program, operations be-
ing finances out of the Puerto Rico Revolving Fund consisting
of income derived from the operation of projects and sales of
23
property. The very latest reports show all the project to
be eminently successful financially. Especially is this true
of the Lafayette Sugar Mill Cooperative as now organized. The
agricultural marketing cooperatives set up in the period 1940 -
1946 realized a total gross income in 1945-1946 of $657,000.
To service all the marketing cooperatives there was organized
in 1946 (June 29) under the newly enacted General Cooperative
Association Act of 1946 a central cooperative to serve as a
puehasing agent for its members and to offer them services which
include refrigeration and storage facilities, packing and handling
of agricultural products, etc.
Although a farm management study made in 1942 of the farms
in the tobacco region, ranging from 4 to 10 cuerdas in size,
revealed the fact that this type of farm was not self-sustaining
and that had not the income of the farmers been increased by
work furnished them off the farms by the PRRA, the resultant
23
This fund had a hlance of $2,927,000 as of June 30, 1946. Cf.Annual Report of Governor of Puerto Rico, 1946.
24
24
Cf • Daniel A. Haddock, ”A Study of 96 PRRA Small Farms in Cayey,
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income would not have been sufficient to maintain the resettlers
and their families even at the low wages prevalent in that area,
yet an adequate appraisal of the land reform program of the
PRRA is not now possible. A complete study needs to be made
(and is possibly in the process at this writing) of the full ef-
fect of the program on Puerto Rican agriculture and agricultural
laborers. Undoubtedly it can be concluded that the plane of
living of the agricultural laborer who settles on a small farm
or even on a small plot is improved provided, of course, that
the same opportunities for work are maintained and that the
value of the crops he raises is higher than the value of those
obtained from the land which his landowner had previously let
him plant.
Farm Security Administration
In addition to the work of the Puerto Rico Reconstruction
Administration, other Federal agencies have undertaken programs
of land reform in the Island. The most significant of these
programs has been that of the Farm Security Administration. The
FSA 1 s Tenant Purchase Program, later called the Farm Ownership
Program, was started in Puerto Rico in March 1938. From that
date to June 30, 1943, there had been established 491 small
farms totalling 17,764 cuerdas.
It is interesting to note that some of the most important
projects of the FSA are located in the sugarcane area on land
24
(Gont.) Cidra and Aibonito,” Univ . of ?. R. Agr Sxp Sta Bulletin
65
,
June 1942 (In Spanish with English summary)
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purchased from sugar mills and related interests. (See Table II)
In the case of the La Plata Sugar Company the sale of these
lands to FSA was made with the consent of the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico because a proceeding had been begun against that
corporation fr violation of the 500 acre law.
The Farm Security Administration does not purchase land
directly. The personnel of the FSA appraise the land and divide
it into conveniently sized farms adequate to support a family
on a fairly decent plane of living and provide for repayment,
amortized over a period of 40 years at an interest rate of 3%
on the unpaid principal. FSA then selects persons to whom it
mkkes loans for the acquisition of the land, for building a
home, and for buying equipment and stock. The borrowers operate
their farms under a farm-and-home management plan prepared with
25
the help of the Rural Rehabilitation supervisors of the FSA.
The program of the Farm Security Administration has two
major phases in Puerto Rico--Farm Ownership loans for the pur-
chase of family type farms or the enlargement of economic units
into family type farms and Rural Rehabilitation loans to finance
operations on established farms. The latter loans are made to
low income farmers who are unable to secure needed credit on
reasonable terms from other sources and the loans are supplemented
by practical guidance and supervision. During the fiscal year
ending 30 June 1946, 60 families borrowed an average of $4,455
25
Cf. S.L. Descartes, Land Reform in Puerto Rico, cited, p. 406
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to purchase farms while 13 additional loans were made to fami-
lies already established. 6,697 families during 1945-46 took
advantage of rural rehabilitation loans of whom 1,982 were
initial borrowers. Up to June 30, 1946 a total of 14,805 per-
sons had borrowed through FSA auspices of whom 10,601 were still
active clients. During 1946 FSA assisted 2,517 families to ob-
26tain written leases on farms to be operated.
Included also in FSA’s rural rehabilitation program are
various health services among which are the organization of
health associations and the installation of sanitary facilities.
In 1945-46, 598 privies were installed, along with 58 individual
and 10 community type water supply systems. Rural water systems
in 34 communities serving 589 families were set up at a cost of
$39,000.
There is no doubt of the success of the Farm Security Ad-
ministration program in Puerto Rico. Not a single purchaser
under the Farm Ownership Program has been dispossessed and de-
linquency in payment is negligible, which leads to the conclu-
sion that the size of farm has been adequate for a decent plane
of living and for amortization of the debt incurred. To a great
degree the success of the FSA program ean be attributed to
"the fact that FSA, besides providing adequately
sized farms, makes credit available for building
homes and provides production credit at low rates
26
Cf. Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico, cited, p.68.
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as well as close supervision and an educational
program. "27
Other Agencies
Of lesser importance, hut of great potential and partial-
ly realized value to the Island, has heen the work of a number
of other Federal agencies: The Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion of the Federal Department of Agriculture, the Commodity
Credit Corporation, the Emergency Crop and Feed Loan Office,
the Federal Land Bank of Baltimore, the Field Service Branch
of the Production and Marketing Administration of the Federal
Department of Agriculture, and the Soil Conservation Service.
Add to their contribution to land reform and better dis-
tribution of agricultural income, the achievements of such
insular agencies as the Agricultural Company, the Agricultural
Experiment Station of the University of Puerto Rico, The Coffee
Insurance Corporation of Puerto Rico, Extension Service of
the University of Puerto Rico, the Tobacco Institute, the In-
stitute of Tropical Agriculture, the Land Authority, the Plan-
ning, Urbanizing and Zoning Board, and the Water Resources
Authority. A rather formidable array of agencies have arisen,
especially in the period since 1935, to attack the problems
of land and agricultural maladjustments.
27
S.L. Descartes, Land Reform in Puerto Rico
,
cited, p. 406
"The successful operation of the sugarcane farms
established in the lands formerly belonging to Central
San Jose and ranging in size from 22.2 to 69.5 cuerdas
has been very significant. One of the difficult prob-
lems, that has to be solved in executing a land reform
in the sugarcane industry is assurance of a regular sup-
ply of cane to the mill. Central San Jose does not grow
cane now. During the two harvesting seasons of 1941 and
1942 the small farms established on the lands bought from
~J
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A good measure of attention will be devoted to a number of
the insular agencies, especially the Land Authority and the
Agricultural Company. We here can consider only generally the
work of some of the Federal agencies listed above. The Agri-
cultural Experiment Station of the Federal Department of Agri-
culture has been devoting itself especially to research in the
\
field of alternative crops to sugar cane, among them bamboo,
vanilla, essential oils and spices.
The Commodity Credit Corporation has centered its activi-
ties in stimulating aigar production on the Island. In conjunc-
tion with the Sugar Branch of the Production and Marketing Ad-
minl&ration, it has purchased at the end of the crop years
1945-44, 1944-45, 1945-46 the entire raw sugar crop as a re-
sult of the ending of the quota controls in 1942. In addition
CCC lent some $11,500,000 to mills on unshipped stocks in 1945-
46. Support payments were made to growers at $.85 per 100
pounds of raw sugar and $.15 per 100 pounds to processors with
the proviso that laborers share proportionately in those pay-
ments.
During 1945-46 the Emergency Crop and Feed Loan Office
approved and disbursed $1,730,000 to 5241 persons for cultiva-
tion and harvesting of crops.
27 (Cont.) the San Jose interests have been able to maintain a
steady supply of sugarcane to the mill. This has proved that
a large number of small farmers when properly supervised and
coordinated, can maintain a stable flow of sugar to the mill.
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On June 30, 1946 outstanding loans of the Federal Land
Bank of Baltimore totalled $11,720,000 with net delinquency
consistently decreasing over recent years. Only six farms
were foreclosed during the year.
The Field Service Branch of the Production and Marketing
Administration made p^ments of $13,000,000 to some 13,000
growers, most of whom held less than 500 acres, for crop financ-
28
ing due to deficiencies caused by the drought.
The program of soil conservation in Puerto Rico under the
Soil Conservation Service of the Federal Department of Agricul-
ture was given great impetus by the passage during 1946 of the
Soil Conservation Districts Act. The Soil Conservation Service
made a study of the minimum field service organization needed
to establish and carry on a coordinated program of soil conser-
29
vation over all the Island.
The effect of the Federal Government’s new policy toward
the Island has yet to be fully evaluated. A recent study of
the benefits received both as a result of the free trade advan-
tages accruing to Puerto Rico from its position under the Ameri-
can flag and of the economic aids from other sources, asserts
Payments were for 1944-45 crops
Size of Farms Humber of Farms Total Paid
1 - 500 acres 12,680 $8,520,959.73
over 500 acres 136 4,540,073.38
Cf. Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico, cited.
29
For a full report of the services rendered, see reports of
each of the government agencies mentioned or the Annual Re
Port of the Governor of Puerto Rico, cited above.
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that,
"the Puerto Rican economy has clearly gained much
more than it has lost ... whereas the economy of
the continental United States has lost much more
than it has gained." 30
The total amount received by Puerto Rico from 1898 through 1943
for loans and emergency expenditures for hurricanes, unemploy-
ment and work relief grants, for agriculture adjustment, farm
security, soil conservation, food relief, public health, and
both military and non-military war projects was a modest |>306
million, 94$ of which was received after 1933, when sugar pro-
31duction was reduced.
There is no doubt that a great change has been wrought
in the insular economy by recent policies. The most signifi-
cant of these changes, perhaps, is not to be seen in the economic
realm but in the psychological attitude of the Puerto Rican
leaders themselves. They no longer regard their problems as
unsolvable.
30
Cf. Tariff Commission, The Ec onomy of Puerto Rico
,
(Washing-
ton, 1946) pp. 5-11.
31
Loc . cit .
,
p. 4. Puerto Ricans point out that, while sugar
production was restricted by artificial means at the time,
maximum output would have been reached anyway within a few
years. Hence, Federal spending for rehabilitation was, they
believe, justified economically.
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CHAPTER VI
A "PLANNED PROGRAM
"The land in Puerto Rico is to be considered as a source
of life, dignity and economic freedom for the men and women
who till it, and it is declared that it is the policy of the
People of Puerto Rico that finally each person who tills the
land shall he the owner of that land which supports him, u
Land Law of Puerto Rico (Act No. 26) Quotation is from the
statement of motives.
v
'
•
..
.
.
.
The favorable political climate of Washington prompted
rather startling changes in the Puerto Rican scene although
these changes were slow in coming. The knowledge that support
was forthcoming for insular action on land reform proved a
strong stimulus for a popular movement that had been gaining
momentum during the first seven years of the New Deal among
all classes of Puerto Ricans. When the legal basis for land
reform had been laid, all the necessary elements of a party
program were present.
Legal Basis
Within a few months after the passage of Law No. 33, whose
purpose had been to expedite the legal proceedings necessary
to enforce the 500 acre law, action was instituted against
several corporations. Not until July 30, 1938 did the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico hand down its first decision in the matter
of the People of Puerto Rico versus defendant landholders.
This was a favorable decision upholding the enforcement of the
500 acre law. Although the decision was reversed in the
Boston Circuit Court, the Federal Supreme Court finally estab-
lished enforcement proceedings on a firm basis by deciding in
1 ^
the case of the People of Puerto Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Ino
that the defendant corporation was guilty of holding land in
violation of the law, imposing fines and costs amounting to
$>7,000 and ordering dissolution of the corporation. The
^People of Puerto Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc. 53 P.R.R. 741
decided July 30, 1938 and affirmed March 25, 1940 in 309 U.S.
543, 84 L. Ed. 916.
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attorney for the People of Puerto Rico appeared immediately
before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and moved for the
appointment of a receiver to execute the decision of the court.
The court acted favorably on this motion and the defendant
appealed. The final decision, pronounced by the Federal Su-
preme Court on March 16, 1942, established the legality of the
appointment of a receiver to enforce the dissolution of the
corporation and the alienation of the lands illegally operated.
2A few days later the receivers were appointed.
Six tedious years of constant litigation from January 1936
to March 1942 were spent to establish the legality of each step
necessary to enforce the 500 acre law. After 42 years enforce-
ment was now possible and a definite procedure had been evolved:
(1) "quo warranto” proceedings before the insular Supreme
Court; (2) granting of consent decrees or the appointment of
receivers; (3) preferential purchase of the excess lands by
the government; the legal basis for action had been established,
"The people of Puerto Rico were confronted with the
responsibility of executing a land-reform program that
affected the very life of its principle industry." 3
The Origin of the Popular Democratic Party
In the period immediately following the ceding of Puerto
Rico to the United States, two Puerto Rican political parties
2 /
Miguel Guerra Mondragon, attorney in the 500 acre litigation
division of the Insular Department of Justice has given perso-
nal data on legal action to S.L. Descartes. Cf. S.L. Descartes,
"Land Reforru in P uerto Rico," Jml of Land and Public Utility
Economics
.
(Nov. 1943) Vol. XIX-tfST ^7 ppr“3,T7=-41T: *L
3
S.L. Descartes, 0£. cit .
,
p. 400.
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had fought for supremacy in the Island. Of greatest importance
in all contests was the issue of the political status of the
Island. The federals, who soon changed their name to Unionists,
were divided in their opinions— some favoring independence and
others a vague autonomous status—whereas the Republicans con-
sistently aspired to statehood. It would have been relatively
impossible for any political observer to have discerned any
important palpable differences in social and economic thinking
between the two parties. Political thinking and adherence was
conditioned by political status platforms and strong personal
devotion to party leaders. In a sense, Luis Munoz Rivera was
the Unionist party and Dr. Jose' Celso Barbosa was the Republican
party.
The first party to suggest solutions for Puerto Rico’s
economic problems independent of the status issue, the pro-
United States Socialist party, founded in 1912, had in its ini-
tial years a vigorous program not unlike that of the British
Labor Party. The party under Santiago Igle'sias, for it too had
to have a leader, gained many adherents during the World War I
and postwar period causing the Union and Republican parties to
form an "Alliance" for the 1924 elections. Some of the dissi-
dent Republicans, however, joined with the Socialists to form
a "Coalition", while dissident Unionists formed a new Liberal
party. The Coalition came to the front and won both the 1932
and the 1936 elections by substantial margins, but the crusad-
ing spirit of the Socialists was gone. The confused political
i
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pot-pourri was still dominated by one issue, that of political
status above all else. For three decades Puerto Ricans of all
classes had been led to believe that the final settlement of
their problems would come in the achievement of a definite
political status.
The introduction of the Tydings Bill in the United States
Senate in 1936, offering unconditional independence, came as a
shock to many of those who had believed independence to be the
only feasible solution. It forced nationalist-minded Puerto
Ricans to analyze the economic implications of the various
status proposals. It caused all Puerto Ricans to face the very
real fact, however, unpalatable, that for the present at least,
Puerto Rico was economically wedded to the United States for
better or for worse, and to recast their thinking about the
Island* s future accordingly. The result was the rise of a new
party, pledged to reform within the existing political frame-
work, which six years after its creation claimed the support
4
of 65^ of the electorate.
As in the past, so now with the Popular Democratic Party,
a dominant personality guided the setting up of a political
platform. Luis Munoz Marin, son of Luis Munoz Rivera, had been
a Liberal until 1938. Of all Puerto Rican leaders Munoz Marin
4
For short political histories see Max Egloff
,
Puerto Rico Hand-
book (San Juan 1947). p. 21; Olive Holmes, "PuehTd "RiS'dT AE
American Responsibil " ~ ~ ‘
,
Mar 1, 1947(Vol XXII, No. 24); 406
.,
.
..
‘
'
•
'
*
JJ fij
.
*
-
.
•
.
•
t
.
•
84
was perhaps the one who had most affinity for Americans, He
spoke English with a Manhattan accent, thought in the American
idiom, cracked jokes in the Jimmy Walker manner, was a hit of
a poet in hoth English and Spanish, had married an American
girl, wrote for liberal journals in the United States, but no
one would have cast him in the role of a politician. Up to
1938 he had been regarded as a budding literary genius but his
entrance into the political arena, however much it disconcerted
his friends, inspired the common people who had not forgotten
his father.
Reminding each Puerto Rican with carefully chosen phrases,
that their problems were of an economic nature, not of a politi-
cal, that the solution lay in a redistribution of wealth— to
Puerto Ricans that meant land
— ; Popular Democratic standard
bearers built up active support. They turned in fact to a new
source of political power, the masses, the slum dwellers, the
agregados, the jjfbaros— those whose votes up to now had been
wasted, as these groups were told. The issue, these peoples,
had come to feel in their basic common folk logic, lay not in
who ruled or how he came to rule but in what was being done by
whoever ruled to improve their welfare economically.
"Pan, Tierra y Libertad" was the provocative cry of the
Popular Democrats— "Bread, land and liberty," Independentistas
,
former Liberals and crusading Socialists as well as the masses
/
turned to a new leader. Cleverly and with care Munoz Marin had
worked to gain the support of the untutored masses and he has
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fought to keep that support. This p? eviously untapped source of
political strength has proved his political sagacity repeatedly.
The landless feel at last that their battle is being fought.
[*he Program of the Popular Democratic Party
In 1940 the new party made its first stand for public sup-
port. It carried on an extensive campaign throughout the rural
communities of the Island, pledging itself and its representa-
tives to pass immediately a number of fundamental lav/s to reform
the Island's economy. Its appeal lay in definite promises of
immediate economic betterment for the small farmer, the artisan,
the field hand, the ji'baro,
uThe 1940 'popular' campaign was perhaps the
first attempt to educate the people 'out of ab-
straction into reality.' It cahcided with the
jfbaro's inarticulate understanding that indepen-
dence at this point would mean economic suicide
and appealed to his sense of proportions . "5
The Populares won the election, their first, with a bare
majority in both houses of the Insular Legislature. A working
agreement with two members of other parties gave them insecure
domination of the lower house while the Senate's balance of
power was in their hands. However, the Resident Commissioner-
ship had gone to a virulent opponent, Bolivar Pagan, Socialist,
who had won by a narrow plurality, although he received but
39$ of the total vote. This was to mean that during the next
four years violent opposition would be stirred up in Washington
against the Popular program by a Socialist who continued to call
5
Olive Holmes, 0£. cit ,
,
p. 285.
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the reform program "socialistic ti
The most important of the reform acts was the Land Law,
whose main commitments were:
(1) the enforcement of the 500 acre law through the acquisi-
tion of land illegally held upon payment of a just compensation
to the owners;
(2) the establishment of so-called "proportional profit"
farms, a form of farm organization designed to combine indivi-
dual management with profit sharing features;
(3) the division of farms into small plots to provide land
to squatter families*
Based upon the le gal machinery approved in the Hubert Her-
manos Case, decided Hay 25, 1940, the Land Law, as conceived
by Popular Democratic Leaders and presented to the electorate,
was to provide effective enforcement of the 500 acre limitation.
The new political group had won the election largely,
though not entirely, as a result of its promise of agrarian re-
form* Obviously then, one of the first acts of the new Senators
and Representatives was to introduce the proposed Land Lav; into
the legislature. The bill became law of the land April 12, 1941
6
upon the signature of the then Governor Guy W. Swope,
"The records show that in the senate the law received
the votes of 10 Popular and 3 Socialist senators. There was
one. vote against it and the remaining 5 senators either ab-
stained from voting or were absent. In the House the law re-
ceived the votes or the 17 Popular Representatives present,
3. votes from the "Unificacion Tripartita" party and* one Socia-
list vote. The other 18 members either abstained from voting
or were absent." S.L. Descartes, o£. cit.
,
p. 407.
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Tugwell Committee
In December 1940 after the success of the Popular Democra-
tic party and the 500 acre enforcement case in the Federal Su-
preme Court, the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of the Interior negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding be-
7
tween them. The Department of the Interior was to accept the
responsibility for pursuing the 500 acre law enforcement and
Agriculture was to follow up with Farm Security and Farm Credit
procedures. Secretary Ickes of the Interior appointed a commit-
tee under the chairmanship of Rexford G. Tugwell to investigate
the administrative responsibilities under the 500 acre provision
of the Organic Act of 1917.
The committee held preliminary hearings in Washington and
then moved to San Juan to hear the entire point of view of all
sides, as they hoped. Characteristically the sugar interests
put in no appearance at the San Juan hearings. Thus all that
the investigators were able to hear were the prepared speeches
of lawyers representing the managers of the sugar plantations
and the leaders of the many political parties as well as a few
"disinterested” citizens. Mr. Tugwell and his associates
g
rather reluctantly came to a series of conclusions, the most
7
Cf. Rexford G. Tugwell, Stricken Land, (New York, Doubleday,
1947) p. 101.
8
"Anyone who tackles the Puerto Rican agricultural prob-
lems finds himself struggling among paradoxes and dilemmas.
What seems on the surface to the obvious solution, the one most
politically approved and most orthodox, is to substitute for the
great sugar estates a system of small holdings ... That this is
more acceptable because the agricultural heirarchy has a
’.
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important of which are the following:
"The present system has failed to democratize indus
tidal processes; it results in an ever narrower partici-
pation in management and income*
"The ends to be sought are these: satisfaction
of the home -hunger now so generally frustrated; par-
ticipation in the yield of the land by the largest
possible number of those who labor on the land; com-
pensation for those whose interests under the pre-
sent system are affected by the establishment of the
new system; preservation of the Island’s sugar econo-
my which might well be Icb t if the cost of production
should be unduly increased.
"For practical attainment of these values, there
should be: (a) Effective legal procedure to break up
all holdings of more than 500 acres, whether bx corpora-
tions, by artificial persons or by individuals^ who are
now affected by neither Federal ror Insular limitation,
(b) The appointment by the Insular Supreme Court of
receivers with authority to operate the properties un-
til arrangements for their valuation and eventual trans-
fer can be effected, (c) Establishment of a land
(Cont.) determined set in favor of family farms and a "sturdy
peasantry" does not make it any more remedial. It is, in
fact, no sdiition at all. On the one hand, it would reduce
the productive power of the land, now highly capitalized and
efficiently managed and so make the meeting of obligations
difficult. On the other hand, division of the land into indi-
vidual enterprises could not possibly result in more than
3.000 of them, since there is in question here no more than
170.000 acres ... What is required by common sense is probably
psychologically, or shall I say it, institutionally impossible.
Technique, history and so on have one set of requirements and
the prejudice In the people’s minds have another set. This is
the dilemma." Rexford G, Tugwell, ojd. cit
.
,
pp. 102,103.
"We held hearings at the Capitol in San Juan. They were
stirring hearings ... There Is a great deal in it that may
interest us here on this wider mainland In the years to come.
"Bread.’ Land! Libertyl was the slogan under which Munoz
Marin and his back country Populares had attained to their
slender and varying majority in the Insular Senate and House...
The emotional appeal of such a program is undeniable, especial-
ly in a place so cursed by one crop, cash crop economy and
half starved. Land hunger, sharp enough, anywhere, Is ravenous
sentiment in Puerto Rico. But the Island lives by sugar; and
sugar—when all is said—cannot be raised economically in very
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authority (already provided for in the land law) with
power to acquire and to dispose of land and to borrow
money on its security. (d) expansion of the functions
on the Island of the various Federal agencies, so that
they may finance and furnish education and health ser-
vices for families employed on, or who may acquire,
lands from the authority. (©) Assurance of uninterrupted
supply of necessary cane for efficient mill operations
throughout the grinding season; to this end, growers
might authorize the Land Authority, or other appropriate
agency, to make contracts on their behalf with the mills.
Or some form of public utility status which would impose
regulation on all parties to these contracts . ”1°
In regard to land and management, the report recommended:
"The land and management pattern largely dictates
the human associations to be established. The most gen-
erally acceptable pattern would be individual family type
farms on which the families would have the security of
tenure traditionally associated with ownership, an op-
portunity to achieve independence, and a decent standard
of living. However, many, if not most, of the farm lab-
orers on the lands in question now lack the technical and
managerial skill required for successful operation of
individual units, and for the coordination of such opera-
tions necessary to obtain the benefits of present day tech-
nology. For this reason, and to avoid disruption of the
sugar industry, subdivision of present large scale hold-
ings should proceed cautiously. If lands are acquired by
8 (Gont.) small units.... Thus the dilemma stated simply. But
the land situation in Puerto Rico cannot be stated simply; it
is terribly complex.... The most enduring conflict, it began
to appear early in the hearings, would not be between the
corporations and the people but among the people themselves.
The corporations are willing to be bought out. Their only real
fear, at the moment, is that having broken the law, their land
will be confiscated .... The really big sugar men sent word
in effect, that Puerto, Rico. was, not in any sense their major
concern .... Legally the situation of thfese corporate nolders
is probably that of squatters, but they are very large squat-
ters in Puerto Rico and cold bargainers. They ao in the main
raise sugarcane more efficiently than the ’natural 1 smaller
operators." Russell Lord, The Land, Vol. 1, No. 4, Autumn
1941, pp. 389-390.
Insular leaders never agreed on the extension of the law to
Individuals and as a result the land law does not extend to
individuals.
Rexford Guy Tugwell, Puerto Rican Public Papers, 1945, p. 303
et seqq. ^
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the Land Authority before subdivision is practicable,
consideration should be given to the efficiency of
going managements. The present staffs wherever possible,
should be retained; their knowledge and competence have
brought the sugar industry to a high technological level,
and this ought not to be impaired. They could be uti-
lized either directly by the Land Authority or as lessees
of proportionate profit farms provided for under the
Land Authority Law. However, lessees of such farms
should not be permitted or required to operate on the
basis of speculative profits, should no be allowed to
become owners of more than 100 acres and should not be
selected or retained on a political basis. In all this,
individual family type farms, with their operations
effectively coordinated, should be kept constantly in
mind as the most generally desired goal whether owned or
leased, provided the social interests in conservation,
etc., are guarded. The suggested procedure is for gradual
acquisition of estates over a period of years with a
definitely spaced program so that all involved may know
what to expect and so that the transition may be as smooth
as possible. "11
Land Authority
Legislative action since the assumption of power by the
Popular Democratic party in 1940, consistently reflects the
new emphasis on increasing the means of livelihood through
the extension of government services. The mass of legislation
enacted falls generally into four major groups: (1) public
ownership of utilities; and (2) indus trialization; (3) agricul-
tural reorganization; as well as (4) governmental reorganiza-
tional procedures. The one measure that represents the culmi-
nation of long efforts of Puerto Ricans to gain a measure of
land reform is the now famous Land Law.
In drafting the act the experience of many agencies both
in land utilization and tenure reform was drawn upon. The
11
Ibid.
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Insular Homestead Commission, the Puerto Ric Reconstruction
Administration and the Farm Security Farm Ownership Program
served as guidemarks to basic approaches. The recommendations
of the Tugwell committee, and directly and indirectly, the
ideas and contributions of many--lawyers
,
farmers, sugar tech-
nicians, agronomists formed a basis for formulation of the law.
Luis Munoz Marin, however, was the author, in all that the word
means. He gave it impetus, orientation, philosophy and insured
its political success.
The Land Law sets up an authority as a governmental agency
in the insular Department of Agriculture and Commerce known as
the Land Authority
’’created for the purpose of carrying out the agricul-
tural policy of the People of Puerto Rico as determined
in this Act, and to take necessary action to put an end
to existing corporate latifundia in this Island, block
its reappearance in the future, insure to individuals
the conservation of their land, assist in the creation
of new landowners, facilitate the utilization of land
for the best public benefit under efficient and economic
production plans, provide the means for the agregados
and slum dwellers to acquire parcels of land on which
to build their homes; and to take all action leading
to the most scientific economic and efficient enjoy-
ment of land by the people of Puerto Rico. ”12
The Land Authority is composed of the Commissioner of Agri-
culture and Commerce, as chairman, the Commissioner of Labor,
the Commissioner of the Interior, and four citizens, present
members, ’’who profess belief in the wisdom and urgency of this
Act.” These last are appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico
12
Autoridad de tierras. Ley de tierras (San Juan, 1945) p. 49.
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by and with the consent of the insular Senate for a four year
term. In addition an executive director, now Mr. Jose Acosta
Velarde, is appointed by the Governor, for a four year term.
The Board, to be composed of the above listed officials and
citizens, is intended to be the policy making body of the Au-
thority which has all the usual powers of such ogvernmental
agencies
.
The statement of policy of the Land Authority declares
that:
"It is the policy of the Land Authority of Puerto Rico to
make the best use of the land for the benefit of the com-
munity as a whole. This policy will be served best by a
system of land tenure which will enhance the highest pro-
ductivity and employment and the most equitable distribu-
tion of land wealth as are consistent with efficiency and
low cost. "14
The term "land wealth" implies two things and therefore two
approaches to the problem facing those who came to administer
the Land Law. All evidence pointed away from the feasibility
13
Present members of the Land Authority are Luis A. Izquierdo,
Manuel E. Perez, Dale B. Jacques, Rafael Manuendez Ramos,
Ramon Colan Torus, Francisco Arrillaga, Rafael M. Camacho,
Its officers are Jose Acosta Velarde, Executive director;
Francisco Arrillaga, Chief, Legal Division; Angel E. Marichal,
Chief, Finance Division; Luis Figueroa Torres, Asst. Chief,
Finance Division; Samuel Gracia, Chief, Appraisal Division;
Narcisco C. Davila, Director of Surveying Unit; Raul J. Tous,
Chief, Land Distribution and Supervision Division; Melchor
Alsina, Chief, Title V. Division; Clemente Javiere, Asst.
Chief, Title V. Division; Rafael M. Camacho, Secretary and
Administrative Officer.
14
Cf
. Reglamentos de La Autoridad de Tierras de Puerto Rico
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of wholesale lend distribution. Land distribution on a large
scale would be destruction of wealth, whereas if the general
management pattern were maintained as the Tugwell committee had
suggested, then the results of land exploitation might be dis-
tributed and thus the "land wealth” could be said to be distri-
buted.
The legal machinery set up to divest the land corporations
of their holdings must of necessity also grant to the government
or to one of its agencies the preferential right of purchase,
if any planned approach to redistribution is to be allowed. Thus
the land law provides that the Land Authority shall have authori-
ty to acquire landholdings at private sales held by the receivers
Dy preferent right over the rights of other persons or entities.
These sales are required to begin within six months from the date
of the establishment of the receivership. However, a limit is
set on the preferent right of purchase for after the passage of
five years the public at large is entitled to contract for the
purchase of any parcel of the land, except that the court may
for any reason extend the period beyond the five year limit.
Even after the five year limit, in any public sale that shall be
held of the lands in question, the Authority is to have priority
or preference to purchase whenever it shall offer a price equal
' o that offered by the highest bidder. This sort of provision
is necessary to maintain control over the process of breakdown
15
Cf. Puerto Rico, Autoridad de tierras, op. cit.
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of large estates. The fact that the great amount of money that
would he required to acquire all the land at one time was not
easily obtainable and that at some future time the money require
for purchase might be lacking necessitated the setting aside
of a period during which the Land Authority might obtain the
funds needed.
In general the funds of the Authority are obtained from
two sources, bond issues and special legislative appropriation.
The bonds issued are of two classes: Bonds of the People of
Puerto Rico to be issued on the request of the Authority by
the Treasurer of Puerto Rico in an amount not to exceed five
million dollars; and Bonds of the Land Authority which the
Authority is empowered to issue from time to time up to a sum
equal to seventy-five percent of the purchase price of the
lands it may have acquired.
On the lands acquired, the Land Authority is authorized
to set up individual holdings having an area of not less than
16
five acres and not more than twenty-five acres each. The
Authority is empowered to fix conditions of sale for these
individual farms, except that that the repayment period cannot
be more than 40 years, nor can the interest rate be higher than
5$ or lower than of 1% above the rate of Interest fixed for
the bonds issued by the Authority for the lands in question.
d
16
As amended by Law 157, approved May 14, 1943. Originally the
size limits were "not less than 10 nor more than 100 acres.
This amendment is unfortunate; it reduces the required flexi-
bility in regard to size of individual farms.
.,
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Candidates for these farms shall not he over 50 years of
age or under 21 years of age and shall have had at least five
years experience in the branch of agriculture to which the
farm Is to be devoted or shall have obtained a degree in agri-
cultural science with not less than two years’ practical experi-
ence on the farm. These protective holders must not own other
land except that if the land now held is insufficient to support
the holder’s family, a specific exemption may be made. Also
those who are to acquire these farms must in general live in
the area, must not be public employees, or employees of private
enterprises, must not have more than 24 of the maximum value
of the farm to be purchased in ready cash. No initial payment
is required.
Although these requirements seem at first blush to be re-'
strictive, they are hardly so for at least 75$ of Puerto Ricans
can meet all of them. The process of selection in recent years
has admittedly been made political capital. A great ceremony
is announced for the particular district and one of the leaders
of the Populares makes the selection out of a bowl into which
have been placed the names of all eligibles in the district
who have applied. When they are known, the lucky ones are per-
sonally congratulated by the leader and are formally handed
deeds of conveyance. Up to June 30, 1945 87 individuals and
one 4-H club had received plots rangings in size from 5.46 acres
to 25 acres with a total acreage of 1,188.21 and a total value
of $93,390.36. The farmers under this provision have the right
;
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to use the products of the farm for life in return for an annual
payment large enough to repay the principal in 40 years, with
interest at 3%, as now required under the regulations of the
Authority. While the farmers are at full liberty to produce
whatever crop they wish, they are expected to practice soil
conservation. All improvements made on the property and the
growing crops belong to him; and in case of death, his heirs
receive the amount paid on the principal, one of the heirs may
be permitted to continue the usufruct under the terms of the
original arrangement.
The term "agregado" is generally translated into English
as "squatter." It, however, means a good deal more than we
normally imply by the use of the word squatter . In an island
where, especially in the lowland coastal plains, slavery once
prevailed, it would be quite natural that a tradition of non-
payment of rent should grow up. Generation after generation
of laborers have been allowed to continue to live on land not
rightfully theirs in return for their labor in the landowner’s
fields. These agregados have in the past been far from -enjoy-
ing the most elementary human rights or from exercising rudi-
mentary civil rights.
"Since written agreements between agregados and
land owners are rare, the former has no legal recourse,
while the latter is protected by the agregado’s depen-
dence upon him for employment and a place to liye. The
feudal control held over the agregado by the landowner
has in the past exerted a profound influence on the
political and social development of the Island. It is
this situation toward which the government efforts and
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.
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legislation of recent years have been directed nl7
The agregado problem, like that of the sharecropper in the
lower tier of the cotton states on the continent, is one that
needs immediate treatment. The only betterment that can be
achieved is complete eradication of the problem. The first
and major emphasis of the Land Authority program has been to
provide as many plots of land as can be obtained to remove
these people from their dependant status. In this field per-
haps the Land Authority has been most successful.
The Legislature of Puerto Rico has regarded the program
of agregado resettlement as of so great importance that it has
set aside a special appropriation for the purchase of land for
this specific purpose. The aim of Title V in the Land Law,
is clearly not to set the agregado up as a farmer, rather its
aim Is to alleviate immediately his living conditions, give
him a supplementary source of income and halt the exodus of
agregados to city slums, where they constitute even more of a
problem.
For the purposes of the distribution of land to agregados
they are defined in the act as
’’any family head residing in the rural zone, whose
home is erected on lands belonging to another person
or to a private or public entity, and whose only means
of livelihood is his labor for a wage.”^°
17
Brandon Howell, ’’Patterns of Rural Resettlement in Puerto Rico’,’
Planning for Puerto Rico, a collection of papers prepared for
a seminar in Economic Planning, TIP.R.1945.
18
Autoridad de tierras, o£. cit
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To these people then are given plots varying in size from one
quarter of an acre to 3 acres. The law does provide that nomi-
nal payment shall be made for the land, but "rent paying is
contrary to the nature of the agregado."^"9 No attempt has
been made to colle ct any payment by the Authority. The only
requirement upon the recipient of the plot is that he may not
transfer the property in any fashion. He is under no obliga-
tion to work in Authority projects and on his lot he may grow
what he pleases.
The plan of agregado resettlement has followed the proce-
dure of setting up in central locations rural communities
.
The nature of the soil, nearness to sources of work, to schools.
98
to public roads and to water sources; and sanitary conditions
are the most important factors considered when selecting a
site for a community. After the site has been selected, lots
are set aside for playgrounds
,
schools, churches, stores, 4-H
clubs, community centers, police stations, community pastures
and other public facilities which may be deemed necessary for
the community. The community is planned with streets and all
facilities common to civilized areas. The lots are distributed
by means of drawings to the bona-fide agregados who have ex-
pressed their desire to participate in the distribution Agregados
living on the lands have preference over others and residents
are awarded a lot without their having to draw a lot.
.,
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Houses are erected on the lots with such material up to
the value of $150 as the Authority may supply. During the war
and postwar period little has been done to supply the squatters
their building materials although the Puerto Rico Housing Au-
thority planned some 400 early in 1943, Mr, Jose Acosta
Velarde, Executive Director of Land Authority, told a Land
Tenure conference held under the auspices of the Anglo-Caribbean
Council, at Mayaguez, Puerto Rico; during the month of August
1944 that
"I do not consider the housing problem as the
first to be solved for the poor families in our
rural communities. It is true that they live in
very poor houses, but if you consider our mild
climate and the fact that they will not be crowded
as in slums. Each community should be provided
first with adequate sanitary facilities, medical
attention and fresh water, schools, etc,” 20
By June 30, 1945, 13,103 parcels had been assigned and
approximately 68,000 persons were living in 101 rural communi-
on
ties already established. A In these rural communities 1,106
plots have been set aside for the construction of churches,
schools, playgrounds, etc. By June 30, 1945, 7,893 houses had
been erected, 7,695 by the agregados themselves. Almost 51$
of the land distributed is under cultivation, while an estimated
$478,000 in total value of subsistence crops is being grown.
These agregados now possess farm animals valued at $242,000.
20
From a paper read by Mr. Jo
at the Land Tenure Conference held
22
21
tor ofi tne band Autnority, n a u i n ia
^?SgtMeaSgfifeeSf°£u|SltAS§i2T Caril3bean Council > at Mayagflez,
The 1946 report of the Land Authority shows 126 communities to
have been established reaching an estimated 77,000 people.
^Jgyidad de tierras. Informe anual afto fiscal 1945-46 (San Juan
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Proportional Profit Farms
The very heart of the land tenure program is the propor-
tional profit farm. The Land Authority is empowered to lease
land in parcels of from one hundred to five-hundred acres to
farmers, agronomists or other persons with experience in agri-
cultural management. The leasee of these farms is to he indi-
vidually responsible and liable for payment of the stipulated
rent or for cash to raise the crops on the lands under lease
or for any other obligation. The terms of the contract between
each lessee and the authority provide, in addition, that the
lessee shall be responsible for all property and funds placed
in his custody and shall give bond for faithful accounting.
The concept of proportional profit farms as developed in
the Act constitutes an interesting idea in the field of land
O'K
tenure. It arose from a situation in which lands are rela-
tively scarce and the number of landless agricultural workers
who should be benefited from the proceeds of the land are numer-
ous. The problem facing planners was one of obtaining efficient
management and production and at the same time of diffusing
the earnings among a larger number of workers. The answer was
the proportional profit farm which combines the characteristics
of individual management and profit sharing. The inducement
Land Authority, Annual Report 1944-45, (San Juan, P.R. )p. 9
s scheme is by no means original however.
. Chacra
.
(Buenos Aires, Rep. Arg.) No. 171 (Jan. 1945)
TTSport of the Agricultural Policy Committee of Trinidad
ana Trobago^ Z& Ed ! . '1945.
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for efficient management lies in the fixed percentage of net
profit that belongs to the manager-lessee. The laborer par-
ticipates in whatever profits are made, on the basis of the
24
number of days worked and the wages received.
Each proportional profit farm constitutes a unit of pro-
duction similar to the existing "colonias" of the sugar centrals.
The ]e ssee is required to cede in usufruct from one to three
acres of land to each one of the families of laborers residing
on the farm at the time of its acquisition by the Land Authority
or to those laborers regularly employed on the farm. The lessee-
manager receives from one to fifteen percent of the net profit
of his farm while the laborer must be paid the going wage in
addition to which he receives a share in the net profits in
proportion to the hours worked and the wages earned upon sale
of the year T s crop.
Auditing is done by the Land Authority on the basis of
a simple system established by the Authority and the Insular
Auditor and such expenses as are incurred in the auditing pro
cedure are borne by the leasee up to 3% of the gross income.
The Authority has also set up a reserve fund to meet eventual!
ties and insure the economic success of each enterprise.
The common preoccupation of the formulators of the Land Law and
the Tugwe^ Committee with this problem is shown by the follow-
”My thoughts turned to the way in which we had set
up certain plantation operations m the Mississippi
Delta, in Arizona, and in California, under the old
Resettlement Administration which has now become the
Farm Security Administration.... These insular propo-
sals seemed to differ only in detail from the hypothesis
which had been shaping up in my mind. R.G. Tugwell,
Report to the Secretary of the Interior, Dec. 1941
(TTPt-putrTi s'tTedy" "** ~
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By June 30, 1945, proportional profit farms had been set
up in the land formerly held by the Cambalache Central, Inc*,
in the lands of the Compania Azucarera del Toa, while farms
were being set up in the lands acquired from Rubert Hermanos,
, t 25
Inc. (Central San Vicente), Central Carmen, Finlay Brothers
and the Waymouth Trading Company. All of the foregoing are
in the northern district. Within the next few years the Land
Authority plans to include in this expanding program the
lands belonging to the Fajardo Sugar Company Assn. The Fajardo
Sugar Growers, the Loiza Sugar Company (all in the Eastern dis-
trict) and the South Porto Rico Sugar Company (southern dis-
trict) .
The program has been eminently successful during the first
few years of operation. This was to have been expected from
the nature of the market conditions and the support program
of the Commodity Credit Corporation. The continued high Ameri-
can and world sugar demand, stabilizing influences of price
control legislation, and the quota controlled competition of
Hawaii, Cuba, and the British West Indian Islands were factors
of considerable importance in the success thus far gained.
The following figures show the record of six farm units in
the Cambalache central area for the fiscal year ending July 31,
25
These farms began operation in the crop year 1945-46.
'. .
.
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1946:
26
Farm Designated No. of Regular Profits
As Laborers wages Paid Distributed
1. San Francisco 2,233 $180,840.90 $ 38,845.20
2. Domingo Ruiz 1,865 125,327.04 23,369.61
3. Consejo 1.028 46,261.21 8,401.56
4. Miraflores 624 36,042.07 10,019.24
5. Walcott 824 51,611.56 8,371.15
6. Pajuil 374 34,253.01 13,468.44
TOTALS 6,948 $474,335.79 $102,475.20
The average farm laborer received 20% per cent over and above
the regular income to which he was accustomed before the setting
27
up of these farms, publicists for the Land Authority claimed.
The hourly wage for the time period covered was 44 cents, a
wage asserted to be higher than that paid by any other central
on the Island.
Through 1946 the Land Authority has acquired about 65,000
acres of land, amounting to about 3$ of the total land area
of the Island. The proportional profit farms in operation are
all located in the He ss productive north coastal plain so that
their success has that added significance. Cambalache and San
Vicente, the latter in operation for its first year during
1945-46, showed a profit at the end of the 1946 crop while only
28
two of the farms in the Toa project showed a profit. Negotia-
n The average farm laborer received 20$ over and above the regu-
lar income which he had before the Legislators tended this
vegg effective help a most neglected fellow citizen.”
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tlons were begun during 1946 with three large corporations on
29
the south coast for the purchase of extensive sugar lands.
In this same period the Land Authority acquired two large sugar
mills, Cambalache and Plazuela. Cambalache completed its first
year of grinding under the new management during 1946 and the
report shows a total of 357,000 tons of cane ground at a net
profit of $166,420,91 of which the workers at the mill received
$32,787.24 in addition to the very high hourly wage rate or
30
an average on every dollar earned of 10 cents.'
Any attempt to appraise the success of the Land Authority 1 s
program must take into account the nature of the land problem
in Puerto Rico. A relatively small percentage of Puerto Ricans
have as yet been affected by its program although that number
is at the present constantly increasing. The proportional pro-
fit farm depends for success on factors that are at least as
States
political as they are economic. So long as the United/continues
to guarantee its own supply of sugar. Insular officials believe
that "Authority” sugar will find a steady market on the main-
land. The removal of the protection of the tariff will very
probably have very destructive effects on the Puerto Rican sugar
28
A tentative study Indicates that both low production and high
labor, costs were primarily responsible for the loss. Cf. Annual
Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico
,
1946.
29
See El Mundo (San Juan, P.R.) Nov. 5, 1946.
30
Cf. Olive Holmes and O.K.D. Ringwood "Progress of Public En-
terprises in Puerto Rico", Foreign Policy Reports XXII 24
March 1, 1947.
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producers, be they government or private. The farms are depen-
dent to the same extent that all other farm enterprises in
Puerto Rico are on factors beyond control. This in itself will
make any attempt to foresee the direction to be taken by the
sugar industry as a result of this new governmental enterprise.
The government’s acceptance of the present methods of
sugar culture seems to insure that in time the entire industry
will be highly mechanized. Already on those farms acquired by
the Authority great expenditures have been made to replace ox-
drawn carts and other less mechanized equipment with trucks and
machines. As such the sugar industry will increasingly become
a high wage industry with ample revenue. This will not however
offer any solution to the problem of labor surplusage in the
cane fields. The decrease in employment to result from the
increased mechanization will continue to pose the problem that
this change in management was at least partially made to solve.
Not too much in the way of land reform can, in the opinion of
the writer, be expected from the operation of these profit
sharing farms for as profits go up from increased use of tech-
nological improvements there will be fewer laborers among which
to distribute that profit. Whether the profits go to government
or to "foreign investors" will matter very little to the dis-
placed workman unless that excess profit (if we can use that
term) be applied to the furtherance of industrial development
in the Island. The overall effect of the government’s entrance
into sugar production is nil, at this writing.
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To show the advantageous position of the worker under the
proportional profit farms, one would have the job of comparing
wages, actual and potential, productivity and capacity of the
competing centrals. No one has attempted to do this as yet.
The only defense "being offered for the setting up of the profit
farms is that they represent the increasing control of their
economy by Puerto Ricans and more nearly assure the proper dis-
tribution of the income from that land. This is an idealistic
concept and not yet susceptible of economic proof. The full
effectiveness of the proportional profit farm will be seen when
its place among the other productive facets is determined. Its
value will be shown if and when the industrialization program
of the Populares succeeds.
The Agricultural Company and Other Insular Agencies
The Agricultural Company was established by the Insular
Legislature April 26, 1945, with capital funds of $10,000,000
to expand the Island’s agricultural resources both by develop-
ing new commercial crops and by organizing markets locally and
31
abroad. It too is a part of the many- fronted attempts to
gain full utilization of Puerto Rico’s land resources. Three
research centers, the Agricultural Experiment Station of the
University of Puerto Rico, the Federal Agricultural Experiment
31.
ixperiijient stations and research stations on
LI as individual farmers, were bringing to
V. . agricultural <
the Island, as we.
light various interesting new possibilities which, because
of the insufficient capital or for want of an agency to ex-
ploit them, never got beyond the stage of a technical report,if Agricultural Puerto Rico were to §et the most from its
land, it was obvious that the government would have to stepin with money and technical knowledge to do a thorough-goingdevelopment job. That is the purpose of the Puerto Rico
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Station, and the Insular Governments Institute of Tropical
Agriculture, are working toward the goal of increased produc-
tivity of the soil through the development of higher yielding
varieties and improvement of production techniques. Practical
application of the results of research Is the concern of the
Agricultural Extension Service of the University of Puerto
Rico, the division of Agricultural Vocational Education of the
Insular Department of Education, the Department of Agriculture
and Commerce, the College of Agriculture of the University of
Puerto Rico, and the Farm Security Administration. Exploita-
tion of the commercial possihlities of their research is the
job of the Agricultural Company.
Among the operating divisions of the company are the
Vieques division (development of a small off-the-main-island
area), the Bayamon Farm division (truck gardening for the
San Juan market). Food P roducts divisions. Fisheries (develop-
ment of a fishing industry suprisingly lacking in the island),
the Markets division (development of self-supporting super-
markets to sell local produce and imported basic food commodi-
ties. One has been set up in 1946 in San Juan.), and the
Fruit Production division (development of the pineapple indus-
try on Vieques). Also there were under construction in 1946
a candy products plant, a food products plant, and dairy pro-
31 ( Cont. )
Agricultural Company. The results of the company’s first year
of life are considerable, but its potential future accomplish-
ments are incalculable ...” Annual Report of the Governor of
Puerto Rico
, 1946, p. 2.
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ducts plant. In short, the program of the company is three-
fold: (1) the development of pilot plants for the exploita-
tion of locally grown food stuffs; (2) the improvement of the
distribution system in the Island; (3) the development of neg-
lected areas and agricultural industries. Such a program can
only be successful as it is fitted into the whole of economic
planning. The failure on the part of much of Puerto Rican pri-
was due
vate Indus try/to sterility quite as much as to the lack of
venture capital in these fields.
The vital and complementary industrialization program
carried on principally as an activity of the Industrial Develop-
ment Company of Puerto Rico cannot be treated adequately in a
paper of this sort. It can be said, however, that the IDC
program has been encouragingly successful but its major aim,
that of attracting continental or insular capital into hitherto
untried fields, has thus far met with disappointing results.
The very success of pilot Industrial plants seems to be
a strong discouraging factor to private capitalists. A general
feeling persists that the Insular Government as now constituted
opposes the private capitalistic system whether true or not and
that the success of public ventures will only serve to encourage
further Government participation in the economy.
Conclusions
The program of the Popular Democratic Party envisages,
contrary to reports, a strong development of private interests
along with the protection of the laborer and the full utilization
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of land resources together with better distribution of agricul-
tural income. The successes thus far achieved are gratifying
to insular leaders, however these successes need to be inter-
preted in the full light of Puerto Rico’s economic position.
Just how completely the reform program depends on Federal
assistance, either direct grants-in-aid or through indirect
assistance of a duty free market only an exact survey will
show. That these aids are in a very real sense "sine qua non"
to the reform program is obvious. Favorable political weather
must continue in Washington for Island politicians to plan
continued reforms. The appointment in early fall of 1946 of
the first Island-born Governor, Jesus T. Pinero, up to that
time High Commissioner for Puerto Rico in the Federal Congress,
Popular Democrat, was signal evidence that during the Truman
Administration, at least, no storm warnings would fly in Wash-
ington.
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CHAPTER VII
EL PORVENIR
”••• I consider my appointment a very significant step
toward the establishment in Puerto Rico of a fully democratic
self government .... Puerto Rico’s right to self determina-
tion has been strengthened day by day ... by our own achieve-
ments, which show that we are able to tacke our own problems
and face our future. Mutual understanding between the people
of the United States and the people of Puerto Rico is becom-
ing clearer. An objective focussing on reality reveals that
Puerto Rico’s destiny is inseparably linked to that of the
continent ...” Jesus T. Pinero, first Island-born Governor
of the Island of Puerto Rico in its four-hundred year his-
tory, in his message to the Insular Legislature, Feb. 11,
1947. (Cf. Mensaje del Gobemador
,
11 Feb. 1947, p. 4.)
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The Popular Democratic Party is pledged to an aggressive re-
form of the land resources of Puerto Rico to a greater degree
to any other policy making group in the Island. Yet the success
of the proportional profit farms, to take an example, and the
political capital arising out of the agregado resettlement
scheme have assured the place of these features of the Popular
program in every other insular party’s platform. Recent ob-
servers of the American scene will find a basis for comparison
in the manner in which the bitterly attacked reforms of the
New Deal now find an integral part in the program of the oppo-
sition party. The issues then come not to center about the
ends for those have been settled, if only temporarily but about
the means and the men to accomplish the ends. A relatively
few in the Island recalci trantly oppose the land reform pro-
gram. In truth, no defense of the status quo will succeed,
if the new proposals can be shown to be successful.
^
The "socialistic" nature of the Popular Democratic plat-
form has been somewhat overemphasized by Its opponents. A very
careful survey of the leaders of this political grouping and
of their actions will show them to be rather cold-blooded
‘
* 0 "Jhe day is gone when they (i.e. objections to the change^..status, quo)
,
are felt to be insuperable.
_
The dogma of arii . . j. - / v y AliO U.UVI QK/J.U • JL 11“ U.UKIlld. U J. tillunrestricted right of property and the belief in the expediency,
of the exercise of that^rlgnt without a title of abatement have
snaxen beyond repair. The rights of property must provethemselves on examination in each particular c3.se, ana. must
suomit to modifications, where a bilance of gain for the public
can be reasonably expected." F.W. Taussig, Principles of Eco-
nomics, 3rd Revised Edition. (New York: Macm'iTlan,19267~VoT7 2
p. 108,
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supporters of the basic capitalistic approach. It must be re-
membered, also, that the leaders are in many instances large
landholders themselves and sugar producers as well. This may
serve to explain why the suggested extension of the 500 acre
limitation to personal holdings was removed from the original
draft of the Land Law, Their opposition to the corporations
was perhaps given impetus to some measure at least by non-
patriotic considerations. Although not Intended to be condem-
natory, a candid observation of the party and its leaders will
lead to these conclusions: (1) that the land reform program
is not directed against the "one-crop" economy of sugar;
(2) that the concentration of land into large holdings is not
per se interdicted; (3) that the major target is the control
of the sugar producing industry by non-islanders (i.e. American-
owned corporations); and (4) that the actual land forms them-
selves are to be maintained.
The Munoz Marin program is not new in our colonial his-
tory. The P hilippine Commonwealth will serve to give para-
2llels to this self generative reform program. In the year
just prior to and during the first World War, the Filipino
leaders instituted an overall development policy looking toward
the eventual control and exploitation of Philippine resources
by Filipinos. The program was begun during the administration
2
To make further comparison, see Annual Report of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands
,
1916-1921 (separate copies).
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of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison (1913-1921), a
Democrat. That period, it will he noticed, covered the very
prosperous years during which the Government huilt up consider-
able surplusses and was encouraged to begin an ambitious recon-
struction. Governor-General Harrison was obviously sympathetic
to the Filipino plans to raise their economic level. The pro-
gram, a twofold one, included a gradual relinquishing of Ameri-
can political supervision and positive measures to improve the
Islands. Among the entities set up during this period were
the Philippine National Bank, the National Development Com-
pany, the Fidelity Bond Premium Fund, the Manila Railroad Com-
pany, the National Coal Company, the National Petroleum Com-
pany, the National Cement Company, and the National Iron Com-
pany. It Is quite ovbious that Harrison felt that no private
capital was forthcoming for insular development and that he
no
was opposed to absentee monopolies. To him there was/ M socia-
lism" in doing what was necessary with government assistance.
The Harding administration, however, spurred on by charges
of "government interference" in business, and the allegation
of too-free treatment of the Filipinos sent General Leonard
Wood and W. Cameron Forbes, who were in/wise disposed to favor
the Filipinos 1 cause, to investigate in early 1921. In the
opinion of these two men the previous administration has failed
to maintain good standards of procedure in the Islands whereas
*.
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the prior administration (Republican) had done an excellent
job. Yet upon the assumption to the post of Governor-General
by General Wood, that worthy gentleman was to discover the
absolute uselessness of his personal policy when all the as-
sistants elected by popular suffrage opposed his every move.
The net result of this attempt to remove the Government from
business was nil. The consistent opposition of General Wood,
was met by the effective political pressure of the dominant
self-determinative parties and the development program survived.
When at last the United States was ready to grant, as it
did in 1946, independence to the Philippine Commonwealth, the
experience derived by its leaders in these economic and politi-
cal development program was to stand them in good stead. The
very nature of the Popular program leads to the similar conclu-
sion that a general economic basis is being laid for autonomy
if not independence*
The Puerto Rico Planning Board
A development program must be based upon a careful apprai-
sal of the resources, a list of objectives set out in the order
of economic and political urgency, and legal formulae designed
to give full support to planned action. The function of plan-
ning in a modern government is the locking of projected improve-
ments into a logical whole.
3
••• The
#
public services are now in many particulars ineffidant
.... This has been brought about by surrendering or failing
to employ the executive authority of the Governor-General. ..
"
Cf . Report of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands,
(Oct. 8, 1921).
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To set up an agency which should provide these services the
Puerto Rican Legislature during the administration of Governor
Tugwell passed the Planning Act (1942) which by the admission
4
of the Governor was his own idea. Because the Jones Act
expressly forbids the setting up of new executive departments
this agency has since 1942 operated as a "board." The board
whose basic purpose was plan land usage and control the future
of land occupation began im» diately after its inauguration to
make the necessary preliminary surveys.
Mr. Rafael ?ico, formerly Chancellor <f the University of
Puerto Rico, who was appointed Director of the Board, later
known as the Planning, Urbanizing and Zoning Board, is an eco-
5
nomic geographer and a very capable administrator. The first
important job was to assist the Land Authority in the selection
of sites for agregado settlements and the proportional profit
farms. As this task was more and more assumed by the Land Au-
thority^ own personnel the Planning Board came to be the gene-
ral regulatory board for the Island’s new public development
corporations and agencies. The guiding of private real estate
development through urban zoning, the direction of the public
corporations through budgetary recommendations and the setting
up and continued expansion of an overall flexible six-year maste r
4
"One measure for which I was largely responsible was the Plan-
ning Act.,." R.G. Tugwell, Stricken Land (New York: Double-
day, 1947) p. 258.
5 ,Cf
. Rafael Pico-Santiage, Studies in the Economic Geography of
Puerto Rico (Rio Piedras, P. R.‘: monograph of the University
of Puerto Rico, 1937)
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plan are the present major activities of the hoard.
gThe Third Six Year Financial Program of the Planning,
Urbanizing, and Zoning Board was presented to the Insular Legis
lature in February of 1946. The program called for an outlay
of $396 million over the six-year period of which $363 million
was to come from anticipated revenue and $33 from borrowing
through public agencies. Eleven per cent of the total was to
be devoted to public service enterprises designed to stimulate
the Island 1 s economy. (The Industrial Development and The
Agricultural Companies) and to improve the standard of living
(the Land Authority, the Aqueduct and Sewer Service and the
Housing Authority). It was also anticipated that a number of
these public corporations should be self-supporting by the end
7
of this six-year period, among them the Land Authority.
From the Land Authority will be separated its program for
agregado resettlement, that to be given to a new agency whose
purpose will essentially be resettlement and development of
backward areas. The Land Authority will be regarded as an
autonomous industrial concern and as a source of revenue. From
the current year all lands held by the Land Authority for pro-
ductive purposes will either begin to pay taxes to local munici-
Public projects are fitted into the six-year plan in which the
requirements of the Particular enterprise are met as public
interest and the present and future situation o£ insylar reve-
nue may suggest. Cf. Puerto Rico Planning Board, Third Six-
ear Financial Program for the Fiscal years 1946-47 to 1U5T-52
(San Juan, 1946).
7
It is anticipated currently that the Land Authority may be self-
supporting by the end of the fiscal year. Cf. Jesus T, Pinero,
Mensaje a la Decimosexta Asamblea Legislativa (San Juan, 1947),
P* T47
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palities, if they have not already done so, or grants in lieu
of taxes will be made/ The emphasis is to be increasingly
on mechanization of production. To this end trucks have re-
placed ox-drawn carts, railway networks have been expanded in
the sugar areas and the grinding capacity of the Authority
held centrals will be expanded where necessary. The obvious
deduction is that the Land Authority is to serve as a vast cor-
poration through which eventually all the sugar industry will
be controlled on the Island. The essence of this reform, then,
insofar as it affects sugar lands, is that no reform is contem-
plated, except in the distribution of the income. The original
form of land usage and control will remain without change. To
say that the economic forces of the sugar market demand that
this treatment of sugar lands be employed does not gainsay the
fact that any true reform in sugar lands will not come through
Land Authority operations.
The Effect of the Settlement of the Status Issue on Future
Development
The future of Puerto Rico’s land reform program depends to
the same degree that all other economic factors depend upon the
settlement of the status issue. What differences a change in
political status will mean will be determined by the particular
status changed to. Independence in any form, whether "divorce
8
Gf. Autoridad de Tierras, Informe Anual 1945-46, 1944-45.
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with alimony," which would mean a gradual reduction in preferen-
tial treatment for Puerto Rico over the initial years of indepen<-
dence or a complete independence with no assistance other than
that normally granted to other Latin American nations, would
mean, in the writer's opinion, the death knell to high cost
Puerto Rican sugar production. Few of the present leadership
advocate unconditional independence. Those who favor some form
of independence lean toward that which was to have heen pro-
hill
vided under the Tydings Independence Bill, This/calling for
a progressive tariff on goods imported by the United States
from Puerto Rico of b% annually over a twenty-year period
commencing one year after the recognition of independence never
received Congressional support. Under that bill, at the end
of the twenty-year period Puerto Rico’s trade relations with
the United States would be based on the most-favored nation
9
clause. The only distinctive economic advantage possessed by
Puerto Rico would be progressively lost under this plan as the
entrance to the vast duty free continental market became less
and less open.
Statehood advocates contend that the natural development
of Puerto Rico politically would lead to a place among the conti-
nental commonwealths. Increasing rights and responsibilities
been
have/ conferred upon Puerto Ricans which should culminate in
9
Cf , Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs on S. 227, 79th Congress, 1st Session, oart 2.
(Washington, D.C., 1945) pp. 173-183.
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statehood. 10 These persons point up the vast increase in
total wealth as evidenced in hank deposits and assessed valua-
tion of real and personal property. Against whatever losses that
might accrue to the Island under Statehood because of the stop-
page of the returns of internal revenue collections to the Is-
land treasury, and the imposition of income taxes against per-
sonal and corporate income in the Island, statehood advocates
point out that gains are to he gotten through increased Federal
Aid. Senator Langer of North Dakota, an avowed friend of the
Island, has introduced into the 80th Congress a statehood hill
for Puerto Rico. This and the recent passage of a hill by the
House of Representatives to make the post of the Insular Gover-
nor elective make some Islanders think that Statehood is only
a matter of a few years.
Perhaps, more likely is a status, similar to that of the
Dominion of Canada, a so-called free state as proposed in the
Home Rule Bill (S. 1407 of the 78th Congress, 2d. Session).
The principal objections to some such alternative are that it
has never been tried by the United States before, and the dif-
ficulty of proving its economic advantages over the present
"unplanned regime of interference." Puerto Ricans are well
aware now that whatever the future, their destiny is and must
be tied to that of the United States.
This is true, too that v/hatever the solution, Puerto Ricans
°Cf. Reece B. Boothwell, "En torno al status politico de Puerto
Rico", Caribe, November 1941, Vol. 1, No. 1.
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ought to be allowed to make the choice best suited to their
needs as they see them.
’’Americans ... have warmly and sincerely advo-
cated a policy of self-determination for dependent
peoples everywhere. It might be a demonstration
of our sincerity to begin with Puerto Rico'....
Puerto Ricans have shown a degree of political
maturity, when they have been allowed to, that
might be envied by some of the 48 states. These
people have undertaken the back-breaking task
of lifting the insular economy by its own boot-
straps. If this task can be done at all, it re-
quires the sympathy, understanding and aid of the
United States * ’’li-
lt is as difficult to forecast the future of Puerto Rico
as to prognosticate on the success of any human venture. It
is reasonable, however, to expect that the general upward trend
in insular standard of living will continue, perhaps now
strengthened by the policy of the majority party. There is no
need to fear, as the writer sees it, economic chaos for the
Island, Imaginative use of insular resources in accordance
with carefully planned techniques should bring an increasing
measure of stability if not prosperity.
Olive Holmes, "Puerto Rico: An American Responsibility,"
Foreign Policy Reports
,
XXII No. 24 (Mar. 1, 1947) p. 291.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
”
• •
•
the interest of everyone in the state is so vitally ef-
fected by the profits derived from agriculture that the matter
may be said to, and is of public interest, and vitally affects
the public welfare of all. It is thus apparent that any con-
dition which militates against the profits of the agriculturists
of this state is inimical to the general and public welfare of
the inhabitants of this state ..." Green v. Frazier
,
176 N.W.ll,
18 affirmed in 253 U.S. 233. Quotation is from the decision
of the North Dakota Supreme Court.
-.
. .
.
. . .
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The examination of a politico-economic program necessi-
tates a very careful delineation of causal factors. The temp-
tation is great to assign as causes those factors of influence
which are in truth results of still more hidden causes. Eco-
nomic analysis of the structure of social reform programs is
incomplete if it does not take into account those non-economic
factors that lead to, or at least strongly influence, economic
reactions, in the explanation of which the social scientist
must resort to more than economic tools.
The problem or problems of Puerto Rico are, as the writer
sees them, manifestations of a deeper more complex basic prob-
lem— that of the direction of the American economy. To assume
that we can examine Puerto Rico’s problems in a vacuum as it
were is to assume an unreality. The physical and social dis-
tance between this colonial possession and the mainland tempts
one to assume an economic and political dichotomy that does not
exist. Any analysis, then, of any phase of Puerto Rico’s eco-
nomic life must reckon with the place of that phase in the whole
of the American economy. Obviously there is a limit imposed
by lack of knowledge to the attempt to fit the problems of
Puerto Rico into the continental whole. If, however, a reali-
zation of the unreality of the distinction between Puerto Rico
as an economic unit on the one hand and the metropolitan coun-
try on the other hand be induced by these remarks, then a basis
for understanding insular problems shall have been arrived at.
.•
.
1 >'t • % « •* ./ c
.
,
, i
,
.
i . - J
-
-J
• - i
*
0 ‘
123
It is neither surprising nor upsetting to observers of the
Puerto Rican scene to find in recent years a trend toward in-
creased government interference in the economic realm. In fact,
a realistic review of the Island’s history will show that since
the United States occupation in 1898, at least, government has
at all times played the directing role in the economic realm.
not
That many of the effects of the government policy were/immedi-
ately noticed nor expected does not belie the truth of this
statement. The conclusion is inescapable that the government
policy or lack of it during the first forty years (1898-1935)
naturally led to increasing assumption of control in the last
decade (1936-1947),
The Congress in 1900 imposed a limit on the Island’s de-
velopment whose effect, if not realized until recently, cannot
be denied. The 500 acre limitation directed against corporate
e^p loitation of insular resources was a setting economic direc-
tion. The consistent reaffirming of that restrictive policy
and the increase in government aid to the Insular economy cli-
maxing recently in the land reform program of the Popular Demo-
crats are the basic frames of reference for anyone who considers
the present outcome not in accord with Puerto Ricans traditions.
Government does not now ’’control” the insular economy any more
than at any other period during the 50-year history of American
colonialism. That the control is now more apparent or perhaps
has taken franker, more discernible forms, is only a commentary
on the change of methods rather than of policy.

124
The writer does not feel it necessary to defend the eco-
nomic policy exercised in the Island or toward it, nor does he
indeed feel that there are yet sufficient facts from which to
frame a defense. It is his contention that present events are
the results of the whole reorientation of the Caribbean economy
toward the continent. It is natural to expect that the change
from an orientation toward Spain and its economic complex to
the very exclusive framework of the United States economy
should have great effect on the Island’s economy. The Congress
in 1900 was aware that such a change was forthcoming and the
Foraker Act as a whole with the land restriction inclusion was
a progressive step toward regulating that change.
Neither Congress nor early administrators could foresee
the nature of the change but any casual traveler in Puerto
Rico can readily describe the complete Americanizing process
now at work in the Island. Sociologists would call this phe-
nomenon acculturation and economists for the want of such an
all-ihclusive word would call it a reorientation toward a new
economic realm and within that realm.
Early investors and their insular management regarded,
as some of them still must, Puerto Rico as a sort of foreign
country blessed from their point of view by the existence of
an American code of laws and administration. Vi/hat they could
not and would not have done on the continent they attempted to
do and partially succeeded in so doing in Puerto Rico. Under
the protection of the law they openly flaunted it and prospered.
**
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That the flaunting of the law was economically of value to
Puerto Rico, it must he admitted however.'1
'
Sugar monoculture grew fast during this period of colon-
ialism as it would have been expected to. The net effect has
been a better utilization of the land, a better exchange posi-
tion for Puerto Rico’s economy and a higher standard of liv-
ing... The difficult stage of economic saturation which had
certainly been reached by 1900 when the island’s productive
capacity had ceased to increase and the population had surpassed
the limit that the productive capacity might have assigned de-
manded some new productive means. The development of the sugar
industry has meant the expansion and implementation of the
one phase of insular production most useful in the general im-
provement of economic position. No student of Puerto Rico can
2deny this.
The problem of the present is twofold: (l) to increase
still further the productivity of the insular resources, whether
they be land, labor or capital; and (2) to increase and improve
the distribution of the benefits of the insular production
thus far achieved and to be achieved. The land reform program
must be considered in this light of this twofold objective.
''The inference that examples of this sort of business conduct
will not be found on the continent is perhaps overdrawn.
2
Some have tried. Cf. B.W. and J.W. Diffie, Porto Rico : A
Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard, 1931).
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These, then are the writer 1 s conclusions:
(1) That the reform of land tenure "by wider distribution
of the land cannot but result in a decrease in productivity
and total wealth* However, a reservation must be made for
the very effective program of land distribution to agregados
and small farmers. This distribution is economically and
socially justified provided that the program not be allowed
to become a political football. The agregado will gain inde-
pendence and his productivity will certainly be increased.
The success of the Title V and the section 25 program have been
the most heartening phases of the whole Land Authority operation.
Great political significance can also be attached to the fact
that this program will result in increased confidence on the
part of the Puerto Rican masses in their leaders, a necessary
base for building democracy in a colony.
(2) That the proportional profit farms designed as they
are to maintain land forms and land usage patterns evolved
under competent corporate management, are indicative of the
creative economic realism. of Puerto Ricans. Their success
thus far is in part traceable to the very earnest and hardwork-
ing efforts of the inspired leadership of the Land Authority.
The future success of these ventures will depend to an increas-
ing degree on the individual autonomy accorded each central as
a productive unit together with carefully selected managerial
personnel but also upon factors over which the Island as a
whole has no control. These factors
—
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competition, and the opposition of beet-sugar producers, will
play a too important part in the ultimate picture.
(3) The program of the Federal agricultural agencies
should be designed to supplement the action of the Insular
Land Authority and give support to it. While these agencies,
perhaps, potentially can give far greater impetus to land-reform
programs than the Insular ones, yet the necessity of increasing
the self-reliance of Puerto Ricans and of providing media for
learning the techniques of management and control by Puerto
Ricans themselves dictates, or should dictate, a policy of
restrained supervision, if at all, and open-handed cooperation.
The Farm Security Administration and Puerto Rico Reconstruction
Administration programs have been eminently successful and are
guiding posts to insular action.
(4) The imponderable effect of the Increasing control by
Puerto Ricans of their own resources is very obviously in the
direction of autonomy. Whether this will lead to active and
equal participation in the political life of the continent
(e.g. Statehood) or to increasing self-reliant movements result-
ing eventually in formal independence is a moot question. The
constant affirmation by Munoz Marin that economic betterment
must come before settlement of the status issue, if a little
unsound economically, Is nevertheless a good working policy
for present leadership. The people are being encouraged to par-
ticipate in the lifting of Puerto Rico by her own bootstraps,
to use a now familiar phrase. If aid should come in the form
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of the final settlement of the status question then the average
Puerto Rican will not apathetically accept this outside impo-
sition hut will feel it has been as aresult of his own efforts
and should in natural sequence lead to more democratic partici-
pation in government.
(5) That there is no reason to anticipate or suggest that
sugar will he replaced hy a varied agriculture. Sugar is and
will continue to he, so long as present conditions prevail, the
one crop hest suited for the Island. In this connection four
facts should he considered:
(a) The acreage value of crops in Puerto Rico is almost
3
six times as high as on the mainland due principally to sugar.
(h) Sugar has not replaced food crops. The acreage
4
of such crops was three times as great in 1939 as in 1899.
(c) Sugarcane is now grown principally on the coastal
See Table VI, See also page 136, n, 2, infra
Figures in this table are in thousands
1899
Total crop area harvested 391.5
Sugar cane 70.1
Food Crops 64.1
of cuerdas
1939
828.0
229.8
209.0
In 1899 sugar represented about 20$ of the total crop area,
in 1939 about 28$; whereas foodcrops represented about 16$ in
1939 25$. These figures taken from Annual Book of Statistics
(San Juan, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, 1944)
Table 91 Cf. Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing and Zoning
Board, Technical Paper No. 1 (San Juan, 1944) and Dudley Smith
and Wm. M. Requa, Puerto Rico Sugar Facts (Washington, D. C.:
Assn, of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, 1939)
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5plains much of which were formerly pastures,
(d) Puerto Rico depends to no greater extent upon
sugar than the principal crop areas of the maidand depend on
gthe one crop they specialize in.
The wise policy of the dominant party does not contemplate any
change in the sugar agriculture nor has any qualified agricul-
tural expert recommended a change. The charge that sugar does
.
not produce enough to support Puerto Rico should he considered
in the light of the fact that there are about nine times as
many laborers in relation to the area in crops as on the main-
7
land. This means that economic exchange value of the laborer
is relatively low to start with and that there is a surplus of
labor.
(6) That there are two non-agricultural avenues open to
Puerto Rico as a result of her surplus of labor; the one--an
increase in industrialization— and the other, emigration (prefer-
ably planned) . While this paper can only lightly touch the
problem of industrialization, yet candid analysis will lead to
the conclusion that the lack of venture capital in Puerto Rico
(this despite large balances in sugar-production-oriented banks)
and the lack of awareness on the continent of the potential
low-cost labor supply in Puerto Rico are principal factors in
the failure to industrialize thusfar. A well planned many
Governor William K. Hunt said in 1902 that:
"Lands which have Ion
to cane. It
near the coas
pevpted. entire
lac
rob able t\
nd along the
to su^ap, anc
ain fallow are now being, planted
most or the leve,.., land lyinglarger streams wilt ere 1c
the pasture —
ns anc
of' the Governor of
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fronted offensive is under way to achieve industrialization.
It may succeed. As for emigration, it is already in progress.
For this present exodus so large as compared with past move-
ments, the writer offers two possible explanatory suggestions,
the result of his own observations in the Island. First, the
army dependency benefit pay reached the families of 90,000
Puerto Rican soldiers during the recent war and continues to
reach the families of the many postwar volunteers. A good deal
was earned by Puerto Ricans in the construction of the vast
bases on the Island. Thus surplus income has enable many to
move their families to large continental cities like Atlanta,
New Orleans, New York, and Chicago. There they are no longer
Puerto Rican problems and become competitors in the labor mar-
ket along with a good many others. Second, the effect of the
continental oriented education and the publicity media (radio,
periodicals, and movies) has been to make most Puerto Ricans
look toward the continent as the land of opportunity. If, then,
.
these migrants seem badly off in their new found homes, it must
be remembered that by their judgment, their lot is greatly im-
proved. The initial phase of any migratory movement hardly
furnishes a fair standard of measurement of social success.
The writer has no doubt that these people will fit as well into
their new environments as in Puerto Rico, Perhaps their ad-
justment will be better; it could not be worse. Economists
6See Table 91
*7
In 1935 an average of 4.2 persons (compiled from Agricultural
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could have pointed out a few years ago when suggestions for
emigration were being met by the assertion that Puerto Ricans
would never leave their island, that when the barriers to labor
mobility are removed labor will tend to flow toward those cen-
ters of greatest labor need. There were psychological, language
and economic (e.g. lack of money) barriers to migration previous
ly. These are considerably lessened or wholly removed today.
It is easy to predict increasing emigration. However, some
agency should enter the scene to provide a planned flow to
needful centers and occupations.
(7) That when Puerto Rico’s place among her Caribbean
neighbors be considered, there can be no doubt of her far better
position from any standard of measurement. If Americans could
see their colony as her neighbors see her, they might conclude
as a British business survey does, that Puerto Rico has "possi-
bly the highest standard of living in the Western Hemisphere
o
outside of the United States and Canada." This viewpoint may
tend to tone down some of the more dramatic pictures of P uerto
Rico’s plight while at the same time making both Americans and
Puerto Ricans aware of the tremendous gains for the Island dur-
ing the period of American occupation.
(8) That Puerto Rico must come to play an increasingly
part
important/in any coordinated Caribbean planning scheme such as
that being contemplated by the Anglo-Caribbean Council and
8
West Indies Yearbook (London: 1945) p. 435.
. .
,
.
,
.
the State Department’s Caribbean and Inter-American policy de-
partments. Her economic pre-eminence is real. However, it
should be pointed out that most of the other large Islands,
Trinidad, Jamaica, HispariLOla, and Cuba, for example, have far
more economic potentialities than Puerto Rico and that her
inclusion in a Pan-Caribbean economic realm would surely work
to her disadvantage if she should los e her place within the
continental economy. As a base for economic operation she had
great promise as more and more American firms in the Caribbean
are becoming aware. Her pro-American orientation, faniliar
legal code and the reservoir of trained Spanish- speaking per-
sonnel will stand her in good stead.
The land tenure reforms being attempted in Puerto Rico
are part of a general reorganization of the economy. In
Puerto Rico agricultural wealth is the large bulk of the total
and therefore any attempt to change ihe system of land exploita-
tion must affect the whole life of the Island. There is reason
to anticipate that the program now in progress will bring about
a better distribution of wealth although no assurance can be
given of the permanence of the land reform.
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PURPOSE
To discuss with proper historical, economic, and social
background the program of the "Partido Popular Democratico”
as evidenced in the Land Authority and its administration
and to compare such similar contemporary and antecendent
organizations as may form a fair basis for judgment of the
progress and success of the subject program.
,.
The problem of an island agricultural economy with a con-
temporary labor surplus and with no present means of employing
that surplus labor is that of Puerto Rico. There are a number
of proposed solutions to this problem: (1) a change in the
monoculture of sugar, either to a more productive single crop
or to a varied agriculture with an increased emphasis on food
crops; this without reference to land forms and usage; (2) a
change in the system of land usage and distribution, looking
toward the establishment in the place of the present relatively
large units of production smaller family size farms; this with-
out reference to crops grown; (3) an increasing development of
supplementary agricultural production along with better distri-
bution facilities. Improved methods, and some form of govern-
ment assistance; without reference to land forms or to change
in sugar production (4) a development of both agricultural
and non-agricultural industry, especially in those fields where
a low cost labor supply will place Puerto Rico at a competitive
advantage or at the least competitive disadvantage; (5) a co-
ordinated development scheme to achieve a balanced economy
within the present economic framework.
The number of persons per square mile in Puerto Rico is
relatively high for a high standard agricultural production
area, approximately 550 per square mile in 1946.^ as compared
^Cf. Frederick Bartlett and Brandon Howell, "Puerto Rico y su
Problema de Poblaclcn, " Technical Paper No. 2 (San Juan: PuertoRico Planning Board) 1946. “
i.
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with. 17 per square mile in Nebraska, 55 in Missouri, and 45 in
Iowa. Whereas these last named states have in general other
industries to employ surplus farm laborers and there are few
barriers to mobility, on the other hand, Puerto Rico has no
such alternative employers and until quite recently emigration
has been slight. There is reason to believe that land usage
in Puerto Rico is near the optimum of intensity although this
would be relatively difficult to prove, yet comparison will
show that the average value of the crop from each acre of land
is six times the U. S. Average and almost a third again as high
2
as the highest state. Set against this fact the relation
between farm laborers and area in crops. There are more than
nine times as many laborers in relation to area in crops in
the Island as in the mainland. 3 The very high productive ef
ficiency of farming is affected in the determination of the
total product and its distribution by the fact that the number
of laborers among whom the proceeds may be assigned is so high.
Low v/ages result. Low wages in themselves do not constitute
a problem, however, for even at the low wage rate prevailing
4
the number unemployed continues high. The basic problem, then.
'The market value of all crops produced in the Island In 1935
gc ive of farm
000, or an
ardens, hay and forage) was approximately
kjj.- cm average of S12Q an acre. In Rhode Island,
the highest state, the acre value of crops was ^93.97 In 1935;
in North Dakota, the lowest, S6.58 an acre; and the national
average excluding overseas territories was $19.59. Cf. Census
of Agriculture (Washington, 1935): Census of Puerto Rico (San
Juan, 1935)
In 1935, an average of 4.2 persons were working on farms in the
continental U.S. for each 100 acres in crops as compared with
an average of 39.5 persons in Puerto Rico. Cf, Agricultural
JensuSig^y. S. (Washington, 1935) Census of Puerto Rico (San
.•
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would seem to exist in labor usage and not in land usage. Why-
land reform?
It is impossible in an agricultural area to disassociate
land from the social context. Even if land can be shown to be
doing an extraordinary job in providing income, the fact that
the income is not sufficient to reach all leads to political
consequences. There are in the Island at least two approaches
to this issue. One group asserts that a disproportionately
large percentage of the land is owned by "absentees” whose
income is a loss to the Islanders, while another group maintains
that the concentration of land into the hands of a few corpora-
tions is to a great extent responsible for the evil. A feeling
of ill will directed against bigness, especially "foreign"
controlled bigness, against the new sugar culture (coffee is
Puerto Rico ! s traditional product) and in general against
Americans results.
The Popular Democratic program is designed to meet both
allegations; that referring to control and that referring to
tenure forms. Essentially the Land Authority (established in
April of 1942) has the job of tdc ing land from corporate holders
and distributing it to new holders. This it does in three ways:
(1) *>y government controlled proportional profit farms
(2) by small family size farms
an
V|s?ima?ed
9£ ^5,000 which included 45,000 in the Armed Forcehi. Max Egloff, Puerto Rico Handbook (oan Juan: Office of In-formation, 1947 )'~o7 42.
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(3) by plots ceded In usufruct to landless squatters.
The proportional profit farm involves the maintenance of the
corporate farm units, of the methods employed, and of the
employees in an unchanged relation. The only essential change
involved is in the distribution of proceeds on a profit shar-
ing basis without payments to non-island owners. The small
5farm program has been conducted on a very small scale and
parallels the program of other agencies. The program of agre-
gado resettlement has had very far reaching effects, reaching
an approximate total of 80,000 formerly landless squatters
in rural areas. The social and political necessity for a
means of raising the level of a serf-like group has made the
phase of the Authority’s activities the most important thus far.
It will be well to examine the assumptions of the Popular
Democratic pi atform and to determine whether they accord with
fact and also whether the means now being employed will accom-
plish the ends postulated. Some of the assumptions are these:
(l) that Puerto Rico’s economic position as it relates to the
continent and to its neighbors will not change in the immediate
run future (2) that the control of any sizable proportion of
agricultural production by other than persons of Puerto Rican
residence (i.e. American-owned corporations) 3e ads to a drain
on total insular income by non-island sources (i.e. an unfavora-
ble balance); (3) that the only agencies suited to replace cor-
5Up to June 30, 1945, 87 individuals had received farms amount-
in the agregate to 1,188.21 acres. See p. 95 supra
..
;
’
.
.
.
. ;
-
<,
139
porations in sugar production are government controlled or
operated ones; (4) that sugar derived income can he increased
and can he so distributed as to bring a higher average standard
of living in the Island (5) that large scale production of
sugar is the best form and that small scale production will
result in a lessened income.
It should seem to any observer today that it is quite
impossible to predict the future of Puerto Rican relations
with the United States. They are in quite a state of flux.
Yet no other assumption other than that of the present condi-
tions extended considerably Into the future is politically
feasible. The Populares are making every. attempt to resolve
the status issue as soon as possible, but the power to grant
statehood or independence or "dominion status" rests with a
Congress whose primary interests are apparently not in the
field of territorial administration. The Populares are wise
to insist that all possible effort be directed now toward
betterment in the economic realm; in fact, realistically no
alternative exists.
The use of the political shibboleth "absentee control"
has only one meaning— that the users want control in their
hands, usually. There is no proof that absentee control is
of any significance in the present situation. Capital not
available in Puerto Rico had to be acquired elsewhere. It is
only natural to expect an outflow of interest payments. Con-
sistently, however, the balance of payments between Puerto Rico
..
-
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and especially the United States has "been in her favor; There
is hardly any ground for an argument to decry absentee control
except the political one that Puerto Ricans ought to control
their own economy. This is to the writer 1 s way of thinking
a valid argument and of great significance to an increasingly
autonomous Puerto Rico.
The necessary inference from action thus far taken is
that officials of the Puerto Rican government are of the opinion
that government agencies aL one can replace corporate control.
Whether this opinion is based on a desire to assure to govern-
ment a control over the process of change or upon a feeling
that only thus can the benefits of non-corporate ownership
be shown, the assumption would be difficult to prove. Evidence
now at hand has shown privately controlled units quite capable
of returning a good profit to the owners and relatively good
wages to their laborers. So long as the present sugar market
is maintained the situation is likely to continue. Only time
will show the wisdom or the lack of it in government! control.
Whether sugar derived income can be increased or not will
depend on at least two factors, the market—out of the range
of Insular control, and productive machinery. Increased mecha-
nization of the industry bids fair to increase returns but will
Nine years of the period 1900 -1944 showed the balance against
Puerto, Rico and recent estimates by the Federal Tariff Commis-
sion show some of these 9 years to have an actual favorablebalance. Cf. Annual Book of Statistics (San Juan: Department
of Agriculture "and uommerce, 1^44 )
Tariff Commission, The Economy of Puerto Rico (Washington, 1946;
Robert Sammons, The Balance of External Payments of Puerto Rico
( 1941-42 and 194T^3 ) fgatt JTtgnf TThi 'V/ of" TUb'rto RTc^ mma ,QTT="-
ice of Statistics, 1945) ( mime ographed )
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pose the problem of increasing unemployment if no alternative
employing industries be found. The proof of the assumption
that income can be better distributed than now will have to
depend on the developments in the manner of distribution.
Higher wages to fewer employers is certainly not an answer
in this case.
All available evidence will support the assumption that
sugar alone is the crop best suited to insular agricultural
resources and that its production is most efficient when
carried on in large scale units. In fact, no student of
the Insular economy, however much he may have previously
feared a "one-crop" emphasis, has recommended a change. The
problem lies not with the crop produced, nor with the manner
of production, but rather with the fact that the sugarcane
industry cannot provide sufficient employment and income under
present conditions.
This overall survey of the land-tenure program in our co-
lonial possession touches lightly many phases of this complex
problem of maladjusted resources. It does not seek to offer
solutions, rather its aim is to provide first, the facts and
their background and secondly, an analysis of the success of
the program under way. There can be no distinction made here
between what is right and what is wrong, only a presentation
of "a very significant attempt to right a social evil,"
..
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APPENDIX

TABLE I
LIST OF SUGAR CENTRALS
IN PUERTO RICO
Northern District
1. Rio Llano - Camuy
2. Los Canos^) Areciho
o . C amb al ache )
4. Plazuela 1- - Barceloneta
5. Monserrate- Manati
i
6. San Vicente- Vega Baja
7. Carmen - Vega Alta
8. Constancia (Toa)- Dorado
9. Juanita o - Bayatnon
10. San Jose 2 - Rio Piedras
11. Victoria - Carolina
12. Canovanas - Loiza
Eastern District
13. Fajardo 2 - Fajardo
14. (Playa Grande)- Vieques
15. Pasto Viejo )
16. Ejemplo )
17. Roig
Southern District
Eumacao
- Yabucoa
18. Lafayette'
19. Machete
/
20 . Guamani
21. Aguirre
22. Caribe
- Arroyo
Guayama
Salinas
23. Cortada - Santa Isabel
24. Boca Chica - JuanSfc. Diaz
25. Mercedita ( p Qnce
26. Constancia( Sauri )
(
27. Rufina - Guayanilla
28. San Francisco - Yauco
29. Gudnica3 - Guanica
Western District
30. Eureka - Homigueros
31. Rochelaise
32. Igualdad
33. Coloao
)
Mayague
z
- Aguada
Interior District
34. Plata - San Sebasti
35. Soller - Camuy
36. Pellejas - Adjuntas
37. Santa Barbara- J&yu^a
38. Herminia
39. Cayey
40. 0efensa)
41. Santa Juana
42. Juncos
- Vi 11 alba
- Cayey
Caguas
- Juncos
Proportional profit farms have been established on the lands
formerly held by these centrals
The P.R.R.A. projects operate the land of these centrals
Land taking proceedings have been started (1946) against these
centrals
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TABLE II
AREA PURCHASED AND FARMS ESTABLISHED: BY NUMBER, RANGE
IN SIZE AND IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: ALL FARMS AND BY PRO-
JECTS ON LANDS FORMERLY BELONGING TO SUGAR COMPANIES OR
ALLIED INTERESTS. FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION IN PUERTO
RICO, .TUNE 30, 1943
(In Cuerdas)
"
' lAKMB eSi'a^lTouEiJ
PROJECT AREA
PURCHASED NUMBER
RANGE IN
SIZE
—Range IN
CAPITAL
INVESTMENT
( cuerdas
)
( cuerdas
)
(dollars
)
All farms 17, 763*87 491 17.4-142.0 1660-9136
San Jose 4,143.15 129 22.2- 69.5 2217-6845
Monserrate 2,286.92 70 17.4-131.0 2526-5363
La Plata 1,732.65 48 20.6- 68.5 1893-7671
Victoria 1,985.81 65 21.6- 68.9 4969-9136
Taken from S.L. Descartes, ’’Land Reform in Puerto Rico",
The Journal of Land and Public Utilities Economics, XIX No. 4
Wov. 1943}
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TABLE III
LAND AREA ACQUIRED FOR DISTRIBUTION Bi PUBLIC AGENCIES
AND ONE PRIVATE PROJECT IN PUERTO RICO,
JUNE 30, 1946
AREA ACQUIRED
YEAR
ESTA^ITShED "HgUTOTT
"
(cuerdas)
1921 38,000,00
1935 44,275.62
1938 17,763.57
1941 62,610,23
162.649.72
1939 5,466.00
168.115.72
AGENCY 1 ’ GOVERNMENT
Homestead Commission Insular
Puerto Rico Recon-
struction Adm. Federal
Farm Security Adm, Federal
Land Authority Insular
Sub- total (public)
f
Private Project (Los
Canos Central)
Total
Note: In 1946 the Land Authority and the Homestead Commission
were combined. The estimated land area of Puerto Rico is
2,200,000 cuerdas. The Land Authority now exercises control
over 4.5$ of the total land area. Information taken from
Annual Reports of the P.R.R.A., F.S.A., and the Land Authority.
Cf. S.L. Descartes, ’’Land Reform in Puerto Rico," The Journal
of Land and Public Utilities Economics
,
XIX No. 4 Uov. 1943)
..
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TABLE IV
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SUGAR-CANE LAND
CULTIVATED AND TOTAL SUGAR-CANE PRODUCED BY
WILL INTERESTS AND INDEPENDENT FARMERS
1934-35
Percent of Percent of
Total sugar- Total Sugar
Cane Land
Type of Producer Cultivated Produced
Administration cane:
American mill interests 23.3 31,2
Other mill interests 28.0 33.3
Total for Mill
Interests 51.3 64.5
Colono cane:
Independent farmers 48.7 35,5
Total 100.0 100.0
Cf . Gayer, Roman, and James, Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New
York: Columbia Univ. Press), 1938.
TABLE V
YIELD OF SUGAR PER ACRE ACCORDING TO ACREAGE OF SUGAR-
CANE FARMS. 1934-1935
Distribution of Farms
b£ Area of Cane
AcreageHTln acres )
Up to 2
3 to 10
'll to 25
26 to 100
101 to 200
201 to 500
More than 500
Yield of Sugar-Cane pei
Acre Tin tons or 2,900
"Founds
)
Unweighted
Average
2.41
2.77
2.89
3.39
3.43
3.93
4.43
Weighted
Average
3.46
3.90
4.57
Source: Sugar Section, Agricultural Adjustment Adm.
,
Release
of Aug. 24, 1936.
Cf._ Gayer, Homan, and_ Jame?
,
Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New
York: Columbia Univ. Press), 1’938.
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TABLE VI
RATIO )F PRINCIPAL CASH CROP TO TOTAL CULTIVATED
CROPS, 1929 AND 1934
Production Acreage
1
Farm Value
Area 1929 1934 1929 1934
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
Puerto Rico (Sugar) 33.6 38.
3
5 54.4
6
65.9
Corn Belt2 54.4 52.2 63.8 66.0
Wheat Belt3 42.4 35.8 45.3 57.3
Cotton States 53.4 35.5 70.7 57.9
Compiled from Census data,
^Figures pertaining to cash crops have been adjusted for acre-
age of crop failure; figures pertaining to total cultivated
crops include all field crops reported less hay and forage
crops
,
^States included are; Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and
Ohio,
States included are: North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana,
Idaho, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma,
^States included are: Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia,
and South Carolina,
^Figure is for 1935,
0Based upon acreage and value of Puerto Rico’s crops, 1935,
. •
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TABLE VII
POPULATION OF PUERTO RICO, 1765 TO 1940
Census Population
Year Number Per sq.
mile of
area
1765 44,883 13,066
1775 70,000 20.451
1800 155,426 45.248
1815 220,892 64.306
1832 330,051 96.085
1846 447,914 130.397
1860 583,300 169.811
Source: Official
Census,
Census of
United Sta
Census Population
Year Number Per sq.
mile of
area
1877 731,648 212,998
1887 798,565 232.479
1899 953,243 277.509
1910 1,118,012 325.477
1920 1,299,809 378.401
1930 1,543,913 449.465
1940 1,869,255 544,179
United States, Bureau of the
Department of Commerce
TABLE VIII
ESTIMATED POPULATION OF PUERTO RICO, BY RACE AND BY SEX,
YEARS 1958 TO 1943 (As of July 1)
Year Population Male
White
Female Percent
1938 1,805,480 694,521 693,558
of total
76.88
1939 1,837,210 709,089 708,255 77.15
1940 1,870,285 723,657 723,028 77.35
1941 1,911,290 727,197 725,481 76.01
1942 1,944,915 750,328 741,811 76.72
1943 1,978,541 764,519 754,906 76,80
Nonwhite
1938 Same as abare 208,098 209,303 23.12
1939 u it » 209,402 210,464 22.85
1940 it ii it 211,251 212,349 22.65
1941 it ii it 228,613 229,999 23.99
1942 n it it 227,750 225,026 23.28
1943 t* it it 231,247 227,869 23.20
Source
:
Reports of
1938-39 to
the Commissioner
1943-44.
of Health Fiscal Years
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TABLE IX
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS, NUMBER OF WORKERS, WEEKLY HOURS
AND HOURLY AND WEEKLY WAGE RATES OF WAGE EARNERS EMPLOYED
IN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES IN PUERTO RICO, FISCAL YEA7 1943
1944.
Industry Number of Wage Rates
units Number of Weekly
surveyed Workers Hours Hour Week
AGRICULTURE 1,297 27,318 39.8 |-.168 $6.65
Sugar cane 537 22,709 38.1 .207 7.88
Tobacco 89 484 44.8 .097 4.37
Coffee 327 2,347 38.8 .097 3.82
Fruits 17 217 36.9 .155 5.71
Cotton 18 116 36.3 .127 4.57
Minor Crops 220 795 40.2 .125 5.02
Dairying 52 438 48.7 .161 7.87
Cattle raising 35 196 45.7 .149 6.80
Quarrying 2 16 43.5 .206 8.98
*:;• Arithmetic average weighted according to proportionate
employment, as reported by 1940 Population Census (Bulle-
tin No. 2 p. 48). The averages fpr 1941-1942 reflect the
effect pi the disproportionate number of sugar cane wor-
kers in the sample. The weighted averages for 1.941-1942
are: Weekly hours 28.5, Hourly earnings $.155, and Weekly
earnings $4.34.
Source: Department of Labor of Puerto Rico.
TABLE X
LAND IN FARMS, PUERTO RICO, SELECTED YEARS, 1909 to 1939
Item 1909 1919 1929 1939
Land in f arms ( thousands of cuerdas) 2,805 2,022 1,979 1,886
Percent of Total land 92.4 89.7 87.8 83.6
Fercent decrease (each decade) 3.0 2.1 4.7
Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing, and Zoning
Board; Technical Paper No. 1; January, 1944.
Source:
*.
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TABLE XI
NUMBER OF CUERDAS, TOTAL AND AVERAGE ASSESSED VALUE PER
CUERDA BY LAND USE, FISCAL YEARS' 1943-1944
Land Use Number of Total Assessed Average Ass
Cuerdas Value (Dollars) essed value
per cuerda
(Dollars
)
Cane 296,589 58,796,180 177.48
Coffee 124,236 2,785,420 22.42
Tobaccoo 12,491 935,758 74.91
Pineapples 1,744 183,594 108.51
Oranges 3,963 448,082 114.54
Coconuts 12,554 1,153,809 101.83
Minor Fruits 181,835 8,021,711 45.88
Pasture 940,291 37,320,483 39,68
Timber and brush
336,355 5,175,237 15.24
Marsh lands 12,076 198,798 16.79
Other lands 24,844 524,704 20.91
Total 1,946,978 109,543,776 56.11
The number of cuerdas shown hy the Department of Finance in
the table, and which is reported for taxation purposes,
differs from the number reported by the Department of Agri-
culture and Coimne rce.
Source: Annual Report of the Treasurer, Fiscal Year 1943-44
..
- <
TABLE XII
GENERAL LAND USES, PUERTO RICO
1939
Land Use Cuerdas** Percent of
farm land
Total Land Area 2,255,684 --
Land Area In Farms 1,885,874 100.0
Cropland .. 1,053,314 55.9
Harvested1 739,751 39.2
Sugarcane 229,750 --
Tobacco 28,584 --
Other field crops 298,178 --
Coffee 181,106 --
Vegetables 6,860 --
Fruits (except coffee) 83,035 --
Not Harvested^ 313,563 16.7
Pasture 618,871 32.8
Clear (plowable) 300,266
Woodland and other 318,605
Other land 213,689 11.3
Woodland not pastured 131,911
All o tiier 81,778
*«* a cuerda is equivalent to 0 .9712 acre.
^Since there is considerable intercropping
,
the total of
cuerdas harvested is less than the total of cuerdas for
each crop.
^Includes land affected by crop failure, in crops for future
harvest, in soil improvement crops, lying fallow, or idle.
Source: Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing and Zoning Eoard;
Technical Paper No. 1, Jan. 1944
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TABLE XIII
NUMBER, AREA, AND VALUE OF FARM3 BY SIZE, PUERTO RICO, 1940
Size of farm Farms, 1940
( cuerdas
)
# %
Under 3 1,198 2.2
3-9 28,172 50.7
10-19 11,288 20.3
20-49 8,575 15.4
50-99 3,200 5.8
100-174 1,504 2.7
175-259 646 1.2
260-499 594 1.1
500-999 203 .4
1,000-4,999 112 .2
5,000 and over 27
100.0
All farms 55,519
Source: Puerto Rico Planning,
'echnical Paper No, 1
All land
in Farms
1,000 %
cuerdas
2.2 0.1
145.3 7.6
151.5 8.1
258.6 13.7
215.5 11.4
191.7 10.2
135.6 7.2
206.8 11,0
135.3 7.2
210.5 11,2
235.1 12.5
100,0
,885.9 1
Cropland Value o
land, bldgs
implements
,
and mac
1,000
cuerdas
inery
<fj>
NP
1,000
2.0 0.2 673 0
110.2 10.5 11,764
99.9 9.5 9,908
154.5 14.7 17,281
122.8 11.7 15,806
106.7 10.1 15,205
73.9 7.0 11,246
111.8 10.6 20,096
66.9 6.3 12,538
94.5 9.0 27,760
110.1 10.5 40,032
100.0
,053.0 182,308
. l-
5
4
f .5
815
8.3
6.2
11.0
6.9
15.2
22.0
100.0
Urbanizing and Zoning Board,
j_ Jan. 1944
.. . .
.
. <
.
, ... , .
, ,
V
. . .
, .
-
.
, . . .
,
r
, , ,
V . .
. ..
. *
•
.
.
.
.
.
.
• . . .
. .
.
, .
TABLE XIV
CROP ACREAGES HARVESTED IN PUERTO RICO, SELECTED TEARS, 189f
-1939 (IN THOUSANDS OF CUERDAS)
Crop
Total crop area harvested
Sugarcane
Tobacco
Coffee
Cotton2
Corn
nice
Dry beans
Sweetpotatoes 2
Yams 2 n
Yautias'"
Vegetables 2,
All other crops^
1899 1909 1919 1929 1935 1939
391.5
70.1
5.8
191.4
17.4
8.4
38.1
60.3
542.7
145.4
22.1
186.9
1.4
56.6
16.1
20.7
68.2
25.2
690.2
227.8
39.1
193.6
2.8
58.8
11.7
34.9
31.5
32.4
57.7
737.6
237.8
52.9
191.7
10.3
70.2
5.2
40.9
47.6
5.2
16.7
12.0
47.7
658 .
6
245.2
45.7
182.3
0.9
49.8
9.4
31.5
36.9
8.0
17.6
3.6
27.7
828
2|
is:.
59
3-3
48
4^
28
176
153
s.o-
.8
, 6
.1
. 4
.4
.8
.4
.6
.8
.1
.9
.4
As explained above intor-croppings will make " total crop
area harvested " considerably higher than " cropland har-
vested " ; the latter figure for 1939 was 739,751 cuerdas.
2 Figures omitted were not reported separately.
3
Includes farm gardens, sweetpotatoes
,
and yams. (1909)
4
Includes approximately 30,000 cuerdas ol forage croos in
1939.
Source: Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing and Zoning Board,
Technical Paper No. 1, Jan. 1944
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